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The concept of user participation and how this contributes to the system success 
has been a research interest for many researchers since 1960s. The importance of 
user participation in the management of information security is widely endorsed in 
literature. Nonetheless, users are also viewed as weak links to information security. 
Shared beliefs and values otherwise known as culture influence user behaviour 
towards information security.   
Culture guides user attitude and behaviour towards information security 
management practices and transcends organisational boundaries. In order for the 
practitioners and academic community to understand how culture influences user 
behaviour, there is need for cross-cultural or cross-national studies. Cross-cultural 
studies in Information Systems (IS) have mainly focused on the relationships 
between culture and Information Technology (IT) development, adoption and 
diffusion, management, and use. Very few of cross-cultural studies have looked at 
cultural influence on user participation in relation to information security 
management.  
The purpose of this study was to understand how user participation in Information 
Security Risk Management (ISRM) practices contributes to the efficient 
management of information security. The study also aimed at understanding how 
different cultures influence user participation in ISRM. To achieve these objectives, 
the study employed a mixed methods research approach to comparatively collect, 
analyse, and interpret data from South Africa and Malawi. Questionnaires were 
sent to information security administrators and information systems auditors while 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with users at Blantyre Water Board 
(BWB) in Malawi.  
The findings of this study showed that user participation in ISRM practices 
contributes to the efficient management of information security. The findings also 
revealed that cultural differences are critical determinants of user participation in 
ISRM practices between South Africa and Malawi. Users in Malawi were found to 
participate more in information security awareness campaigns while users in South 
Africa participate more in remediating defective information security controls. In 
addition, governmental organisations and financial institutions are more interested 














The implications of these findings to practitioners as well as the academic 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Insiders such as employees, contractors, consultants, and vendors are weak links 
to organisation’s information security (Dojkovski, Lichtenstein, & Warren, 2011; 
Lim, Chang, Maynard, & Ahmad, 2009; Spears & Barki, 2010; Steele & Wargo, 
2007; Thomson, von Solms, & Louw, 2006). Studies have shown that insiders 
contribute to over 50% of the breaches to information security (Gordon, Loeb, 
Lucyshyn, & Richardson, 2005). In a recent study by D’Arcy, Hovav and Galletta 
(2009), it was found that about 50% to 70% of information security incidents 
originated from within organisations. This is attributed to user unauthorised 
access to systems (Gordon et al., 2005), user noncompliance with information 
security policies and procedures (Lim et al., 2009; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 
2007; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). This may also come from disgruntled 
employees (Standage, 2002).  
Contrary to the weak-link image of users to information security, users can 
significantly help in addressing some of the information security threats (Chang & 
Ho, 2006; Siponen, 2005; Spears & Barki, 2010; Stanton & Stam, 2006; Whitman, 
2008). User behaviour such as being careful in handling organisation’s data 
positively contributes to the management of information security (Stanton & Stam, 
2006). In addition, Information Technology (IT) competence levels of business 
managers positively influence the implementation of ISRM standards as stipulated 
in ISO17799 and BS7799 for International Standards Organisation (ISO) (Chang & 
Ho, 2006). These standards enable organisations to manage and protect 
information by ensuri g data confidentiality, integrity and availability (Tong, Fung, 
Huang & Chan, 2003). 
These inconsistent views seem to suggest that the concept of user participation in 
ISRM and its impact on information security management remains unclear 
(Bachore & Zhou, 2009). Firstly, the purpose of this study was to understand how 
user participation in ISRM practices contributes to the management of information 
security. This was aimed at making a contribution towards the on-going discussion 
on the effect of user participation in ISRM practices on information security 
management. 
Most studies on information security have been conducted at the organisational 
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security (Straub, 1990; Straub & Welke, 1998; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Im & 
Baskerville, 2005; Sun, Srivastava, & Mock, 2006; Chen & Zahedi, 2009; Johnston 
& Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2009; Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, Vartiainen, & Vance, 
2009). Studies focused on how inter-organisational or inter-country interactions 
influence user attitude and behaviour towards the management of information 
security are limited (Dinev, Goo, Hu, & Nam, 2009; Kwak, Kizzier, Zo, & Jung, 
2011). In addition, studies that try to understand how culture shapes user 
behaviour towards ISRM practices (Lim et al., 2009) and establishing the effect of 
user behaviour on information security management between countries are also 
limited (Dinev et al., 2009; Kwak et al., 2011).  
Culture which can be visible at individual, organisational, societal, and national 
level (Leidner & Kayworth, 2006), affects the way information security policies are 
formulated and implemented. It also affects the way users recognize information 
security risks (Schmidt, Johnston, Arnett, Chen, & Li, 2008). This shows, therefore, 
that culture plays a crucial role in influencing user participation in ISRM practices. 
However, it is clear that despite this established fact, not much attention has been 
put to further understand this relationship particularly by comparing countries 
within a particular region like Southern Africa. This study was done in order to 
understand how different cultures influence user participation in ISRM in the 
context of South Africa and Malawi. 
South Africa and Malawi were chosen based on their different cultures according to 
Hofstede’s culture indices of: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-
collectivism, and masculinity-femininity (Dinev et al., 2009). While South Africa has 
a post-apartheid culture (Oosthuizen & Bhorat, 2004), Malawi comes from a 31-
year of autocratic rule based on political repression (Forster, 1994). Comparing 
countries with different national cultures provides better insight as to how national 
cultures influence user participation in ISRM practices. This would further be 
related to the management of information security.   
A mixed methods research approach was employed in this study. This approach 
was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, results acquired from qualitative methods were 
used to elaborate (complement) results acquired from quantitative methods. 
Secondly, the mixed methods research approach was employed to have results 
acquired in qualitative methods confirm (triangulate) those acquired from the 
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method approach is greater than either that of qualitative or quantitative research 
methods (Creswell, 2009).  
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
Firstly, the objective of this study was to understand how user participation in 
ISRM contributes to the efficient management of information security. Secondly, 
this study was aimed at understanding how different cultures influence user 
participation in ISRM which may have an impact on the overall management of 
information security. The following two questions guided the study: How does user 
participation in ISRM contribute to the efficient management of information 
security? How does the effect of user participation in ISRM vary across nations of 
different cultural origins? 
1.3 Importance of the research 
The study is important in two ways. Firstly, the findings of the study provide 
guidance to practitioners for dealing with information security issues in different 
cultures. Based on the findings of this study, information security managers 
should be focusing on instilling a user participation culture in ISRM practices 
which, in turn, would help address information security incidents. Secondly, the 
findings of this study provide guidance to the academic community for conducting 
studies which span countries of different national cultures. 
1.4 Research limitations 
There were a number of limitations to this study. 
There was lack of a tangible study population. The study population comprised of 
information security administrators and information systems auditors for the 
survey questionnaire and end-users for semi-structured interviews. There was no 
local chapter for these professionals at the time of conducting the study in Malawi. 
This would have provided a list from where participants to the study would have 
been identified. Alternatively, snowball sampling method was used to identify study 
participants. Snowball sampling method is suitable for reaching out to populations 
that are difficult to contact. 
There was also delayed and low response rate. The study was planned to be 
executed from February to August 2012. The low response rate experienced 
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to low response rate in Malawi, the researcher who was based in ate UCT in South 
Africa relied on reminders on by phone and emails.  
The researcher also experienced low response rate on the part of South African 
respondents. In South Africa, the Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA) Chapter consented to invite its 200 members to participate in 
the study. However, there was no contact between the study participants and the 
researcher. This was due to ISACA South Africa chapter’s policy which does not 
allow passing of member details to third parties e.g. researchers. In an effort to 
follow-up on the study participants, the researcher sent reminders to the ISACA 
South Africa chapter office, a process which delayed and affected the response rate. 
1.5 Thesis outline 
The rest of the dissertation is organized into four chapters as follows:  
Chapter 2 provides a summary of the literature which, in turn, creates a basis for 
this study. The chapter begins by introducing the concepts of user participation 
and culture. It then advances to discuss the concepts of Information Security Risk 
(ISR) and how user behaviours contribute to ISR. Concepts of organisation and 
information security culture and Information Security Risk Management are 
subsequently presented. This is followed by a research contextualisation and a 
summary of the literature review. The chapter recognises a few studies which 
provide empirical evidence of how national cultures influence the user attitude 
and behaviour towards ISRM practices. Lastly, Chapter 2 presents the 
conceptual model followed by a discussion of the model constructs.   
Chapter 3 discusses the research design which largely encompasses four elements: 
the research philosophical assumptions, research methodology, the research 
timeline and ethical considerations. The research methodology covers a number of 
areas pertaining to the purpose of the study, the type of investigation employed in 
the study, the research method, survey participants, sampling method, survey 
instruments, data collection, and data analysis. 
Chapter 4 contains the statistical analyses conducted on the collected data. The 
validity and reliability test results are presented in this chapter as well as the 
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Chapter 5 summarises the study findings. The study conclusion, 
recommendations, practical usefulness, and suggestions for areas for future 
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Chapter 2 : Literature review 
This chapter is a review of literature which demonstrates the ability of the researcher 
to show what is already available on the topic being studied and gaps worthy 
intervening (Hart, 1998; Levy & Ellis, 2006). The chapter summarises findings from 
studies that expound the concept of user participation as well as those which explain 
the influence of national cultures on user attitude and behaviour towards ISRM 
practices. 
The chapter is organized into six sections. Section 2.1 introduces terms and concepts 
related to user participation and culture. Section 2.2 discusses the concepts of 
information security and information security risk. Section 2.3 defines organisational 
and information security cultures. The concept of ISRM is presented in Section 2.4. 
The context of the study outlined in Section 2.5. Lastly, Section 2.6 introduces the 
conceptual model.   
 
2.1 User participation and culture 
2.1.1 User participation 
The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (1978) defines the term “user” as 
a person or thing that uses something. Based on this definition, this study used 
the term “user” to refer to a class of people in an organisation who use a computer 
or a network service. Users do not need to possess complete technical expertise to 
fully understand the system they use. Users handle enterprise information as they 
perform their daily duties.  
The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (1978, p. 790) also defines the 
term “participation” as “the act of taking part or having a share in an activity or 
event. Based on these definitions, the term “user participation” was used in this 
study to imply users taking part or having a share in an activity or event. The event 
was defined as Information Systems Development (ISD) activity or an ISRM 
practice. 
The concept of “user participation” in ISD and how it impacts system success has 
been a core research topic since 1960s (Swanson, 1974; Markus & Mao, 2004). 
While it is widely viewed that user participation in ISD has positive impact on 
system success (Jiang, Klein, & Hong-Gee, 2006; McGill & Klobas, 2008; McKeen & 
Guimaraes, 1997; Medina & Caparro, 2007; Rees, 1993; Terry & Standing, 2004), 
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being developed (Bachore & Zhou, 2009; He & King, 2008; Kim & Peterson, 2003). 
Studies have shown that user participation in ISD leads to group dysfunction (Kim 
& Peterson, 2003) particularly where a group does not work as a single entity and 
has no defined goal (Tessina, 2008). User participation in IS projects can also lead 
to increased project costs (He & King, 2008) as a result of contextual conflicts 
arising from development groups such as developers, business managers, and end-
users. User participation in ISD can therefore contribute positively towards system 
success only if conflicts are resolved (Fakun & Greenough, 2004). This is supported 
by previous studies as it was once stated that:  
“…user participation in the development process can negatively influence project 
performance since it could make the process more difficult, lengthy, and less 
effective. Such contradictory findings raise the question of when user participation is 
actually helpful and when it might negatively impact project performance” 
(Subramanyam, Weisstein & Krishnan, 2010, p. 137) 
This shows that user participation in ISD does not always contribute to the success 
of the system being developed. The extract also shows the two different views 
portrayed in literature about the unpredictable contribution of user participation in 
ISD towards system success. 
In the context of ISRM, users are portrayed as weak links to information security 
and part of the solution to addressing information security problems (Dojkovski et 
al., 2011; Lim et al., 2009; Spears & Barki, 2010; Steele & Wargo, 2007; Thomson 
et al., 2006; Chang & Ho, 2006; Siponen, 2005; Spears & Barki, 2010; Stanton & 
Stam, 2006; Whitman, 2008). These different views about user participation in 
both ISD and ISRM show that the concept of user participation is still unclear and 
requires more research (Bachore & Zou, 2009).  
2.1.2 User culture 
Culture has been defined by various authors as the manner in which a group of 
people solves problems and reconciles dilemmas (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 
1998). It has also been defined as a collective mental programming of people that 
distinguishes them from others (Hofstede, 2001), or the fabric meaning through 
which people interpret events around them (Geertz, 1973). The common theme in 
these definitions is that culture influences the behaviour of the people and is 
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behaviour amongst the members of a particular society (Steers, Meyer & Sanchez-
Runde, 2008).  
Guo (2008, p. 6) defines culture as “norms, beliefs, and basic assumptions shared 
by members of an organisation” and it includes “values, principles, norms, 
traditions, unwritten rules, and informal procedures” (Guo, 2008, p. 4). It promotes 
responsibility, integrity, trustworthiness, and ethicality of people in an organisation 
(Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Dojkovski et al., 2011). In view of culture, it may be 
concluded that most of the aspects of people’s behaviour in organisations are 
culturally motivated. 
Schein (1985) describes the aspects of culture at three different levels namely: 
basic assumptions which represent belief systems that individuals have towards 
human behaviour, relationship, reality and truth; values which signify espoused 
beliefs and identify what is important to a particular cultural group; and artefacts 
which may include things such as art, technology, visible behavioural patterns as 
well as myths (Pettigrew, 1979) which are representative of a particular culture. 
According to Schein (1985), cultural values are more easily studied than basic 
assumptions which are invisible and artefacts which are not easily decipherable. 
Cultural values are seen as sets of social norms that define the rules or context for 
social interaction. They determine the way people act and communicate (Delong & 
Fahey, 2000) and have a significant impact on the behaviour of the members of an 
organisation. They act as means of social control and set the expectations and 
boundaries of appropriate behaviours for members of organisations (O’Reilly & 
Chatman, 1996).  
Studies have shown that there are five observable characteristics of culture which 
relate to the behaviour of users in an organisation which include responsibility, 
participation, commitment, motivation, and awareness (Lim et al., 2009). These 
characteristics have been reflected in the conceptual model (Figure 2.4) and 
discussed subsequently.  
Many organisations now conduct businesses beyond their organisational and 
national boundaries using the Information and Communications Technologies 
(ICTs) (Myers & Tan, 2002). According to the theory of network externalization, 
organisations are exposed to external threats as a result of either the users within 
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or customers accessing enterprise data through the internet. This exposes the 
organisations to information security threats which they have no control over 
(Anderson & Moore, 2006). It is therefore important for organisations to understand 
how users in different cultures behave if they are to be assured of the security of 
enterprise data (Ives & Javenpaa, 1991; Shore & Venkatachalam, 1996).  
Organisations cannot be secure unless they become aware of how different cultures 
in different countries where they conduct business influence people’s attitude and 
behaviour towards information security (Applegate, McFarlan, & McKenney, 1999; 
Harris & Davison, 1999). This awareness would make the organisations to put 
countermeasures in place which would help mitigate information security risks 
arising from cross-cultural business transactions.  
2.2 Information security and information security risk 
2.2.1 Information security 
The wide use of IT, Internet, wireless networks and instant messaging make many 
organisations to experience losses due to the damage caused by compromises in 
information security (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Richardson, 2007). Information security 
problems cause damage to enterprise information through malware or hacker 
attacks, theft of proprietary information, or an insider abusing information 
resources (Jahner & Krcmar, 2005).  
There are different viewpoints of information security which are technical, 
behavioural, managerial, philosophical, and organisational (Zafar & Clark, 2009). 
Based on these viewpoints, various authors define “information security” as the 
process of protecting the availability, privacy, and integrity of information (Geek, 
2008). It also implies the proper use of data and controls to prevent accidental or 
unauthorized use, destruction, or the modification of information assets (Peltier, 
2005). Information security is also a “process of protecting the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information” (Bishop, 2003, p. 67). It is a “well informed 
sense of assurance that information risks and controls” (Anderson, 2003, p. 310) 
are in balance. What is common in these definitions is that information security is 
about protection of information from abuse or unauthorised access.  
Von Solms (2006) traces the progression of information security and defines what 
he refers to as “waves” of information security progression. Von Solms (2006, p. 
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During this wave, information security is perceived as technical in nature and only 
left for technical experts. The second wave is characterised as information security 
having a strong management issue where aspects like policies and management 
involvement become important. Information security in third wave is characterised 
as having some form of standardization, where aspects like best practices, 
certification, information security culture and the measurement and monitoring of 
information security becomes important.  Von Solms (2006) finally characterises 
the fourth wave as information security having some form of governance issue. 
The fourth wave of progressive development of information security (von Solms, 
2006) involves the establishment of regulatory measures such as the enactment of 
the Electronic, Communication and Transaction (ECT) Act of 2002 enacted by the 
government of South Africa (Kyobe, 2009) as well as the Telecommunications Act 
by the Government of Malawi in 1998. Information security policies and procedures 
which help to ensure secure IS environments are regularly demanded by 
internationally accepted best practices for information security management. Best 
practices are essential requirements for good IT governance hence for good 
corporate governance (Saint-Germain, 2005).  
Taking a holistic approach to information security, as is recommended in literature, 
information security is defined as: 
“…understanding the potent al threats of an organisation and assessing the 
risks associated with those threats; educating personnel in security awareness, 
code of conduct, and information security best practices; establishing policies 
and procedures to mitigate loss should security breach occur; implementing and 
monitoring technologies to prevent or mitigate the loss from present or future 
security breach; continuous assessment of technology, policies and procedures 
and personnel to assure proper governance of information security issues; and 
incorporating information security governance as an important part of corporate 
governance” (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Zafar & 
Clark, 2009). 
Literature consistently reports of increased concern of information security in 
organisations and there has been an on-going proposition that information security 
can efficiently be managed if the focus goes beyond the technical means of 
protecting information resources (Baskerville, 1993; Straub & Welke, 1998; Dhillon 
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Ho, 2006; Bednar & Katos, 2009). For instance, Bednar and Katos (2009) express 
the need for information security management to not only view the human factor as 
an obstacle but rather as an enabler. Realising the importance of the human factor 
in information security, the Editor-in-Chief of one of the respected journals, 
“Computers & Security”, observed that the human factor in information security 
deserves greater research attention (Schultz, 2005).  
While it is important for organisations to have sophisticated tools to deter 
information security from outside, it is difficult to protect against users. Users 
intimately know the internal operations and business processes and have access to 
enterprise data (Steele & Wargo, 2007). One approach advanced in previous studies 
is to address the information security concern in organisations is the introduction 
of sanctions based on the deterrence theory (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). 
This approach assumes that fear of sanctions influences users to comply with the 
information security policies that are in place (Akers & Sellers, 1994; Siponen & 
Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Straub & Straub, 1990). Sanctions result in reduced 
computer abuse (Straub & Straub, 1990) and increase employee compliance with 
security policies (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). According to the General 
Deterrence Theory (GDT), procedural and technical information security 
countermeasures serve as deterrent mechanisms. Deterrent mechanisms increase 
perceived threat of punishment for IS misuse (D'Arcy et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 2.1: The GDT Model (D'Arcy et al., 2009) 
As can be noted from the GDT model in Figure 2.1, the countermeasures include 
security policies, security education, training and awareness (SETA) programs, and 
computer monitoring. These countermeasures function like societal laws in 
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thereby increasing perceived threats of punishment for offenders (Lee & Lee, 2002). 
The deterrent effect of SETA programs is achieved through security awareness 
briefings or trainings which enforce acceptable usage guidelines and further 
emphasize potential consequences for IS misuse (D'Arcy et al., 2009). The GDT 
model shows that user awareness about the security countermeasures directly 
impacts user perceptions of the certainty and severity of sanctions associated with 
IS misuse (D'Arcy et al., 2009).  
Information security is broken down into policies, technology, and procedures 
(Adams, Templeton, & Campbell, 2007). An information security policy is a 
document which outlines “individual responsibilities, define authorized and 
unauthorized uses of the systems, provide venues for employee reporting of 
identified or suspected threats to the system, define penalties for violations, and 
provide a mechanism for its update” (Whitman, 2004, p. 52). Compliance with 
information security policies and legislation is noted as critical to organisations as 
well as educational institutions (Kyobe, 2010). Secondly, information security in 
form of technology is the artefact that allows users in an organisation to protect the 
information system. A typical example of information security technology is 
antivirus software. Information security procedures are methodologies or guidelines 
which are followed in order to protect information systems (Nyanchama, 2005). 
Information security management therefore ensures that these three forms of 
information security are in place and are up-to-date. 
2.2.2 Information security risk (ISR) 
There are many definitions for the word “risk” reflecting that it means different 
things to different people. For instance, risk is defined as the potential that a given 
threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset thereby causing some sort of damage 
to the organisation (Vedder, 1998). Risk is also defined as “a function of the 
likelihood of a given threat-source’s exercising a particular potential vulnerability 
and the resulting impact of that adverse event on the organisation” (Stoneburner et 
al., 2002, p. 8). According to the economic theory of risk and insurance which was 
originally published by Allan Willett in 1901, risk is defined as the objectified 
uncertainty as to the occurrence of an undesired event. The underlying concept in 
these definitions is that risk is a chance or possibility that an unwarranted 
condition or behaviour takes advantage of existing weaknesses (vulnerability) in an 
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investment's actual return will be different from that which is expected 
(Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002). 
It is practically impossible for organisations to completely escape risk. 
Consequently, Tsiakis and Stephanides (2005) suggest some ways in which 
organisations can deal with risk: accepting it, ignoring it (avoidance), assigning it to 
someone (risk transfer), or mitigating. Risk acceptance is an approach where an 
organisation decides to bear the consequences or impact that may result from an 
information security incident. One aspect of risk acceptance is self-insurance. An 
organisation may choose not to perform any activity (e.g. not installing an 
application) that could have a potential risk as a way of avoiding information 
security risks. Thirdly, risk mitigation involves taking some action aimed at 
reducing the impact of an information security incident. Typical examples of risk 
mitigation include use of effective access control mechanisms, patching of systems, 
and firewalls and intruder detection systems (IDSs). Another way of dealing with 
risk is by transferring it to another party by either contract or insurance cover. In 
this way, liability is transferred to either contractors or suppliers (Jones, 2007; 
Stoneburner et al., 2002; Tsiakis & Stephanides, 2005).  
While business risks include concerns about probable effects of an uncertain event 
on achieving established business objectives, information security risk concerns 
the availability and reliability of IT services (ISACA, 2008). There are five economic 
impediments to information security management: information asymmetries, 
externalities, liability, diversity, and the fragmentation of legislation and law 
enforcement (Anderson & Moore, 2006). Information asymmetry refers to a 
situation where one organisation has better or more information than others which 
makes it to have more power when making decisions during transactions (Kyobe, 
Matengu, Walter & Shongwe, 2012). Information asymmetry becomes an 
impediment to information security management because organisations with more 
power are not usually willing to discuss their weaknesses with those organisations 
with poor information hence less powerful. Information asymmetry can be a major 
problem when organisations wish to have coordinated efforts to managing 
information security (Anderson & Moore, 2006).  
Secondly, many information security threats are attributed to network externalities 
(Anderson & Moore, 2006). Enterprise networks today are connected to external 
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difficult to have protective measures in an organisation when its network has been 
externalized. Network externalization refers to allowing access to an enterprise 
network by customers from outside the organisation. It also means users within an 
organisation accessing information from outside sources using the internet 
(Anderson & Moore, 2006). Network externalization is an impediment to 
information security management because it exposes an organisation to external 
threats that the organisation has no control over. 
In liability dumping, organisations that seek to manage information security risk 
often dump it on less powerful suppliers or customers. Sometimes, software and 
service suppliers impose licenses on customers and disclaim all liability as well as 
information security failures (Anderson & Moore, 2006). Also, lack of diversity is a 
concern against platform vendors. Lack of diversity makes successful attacks more 
devastating and hard to insure against. Fragmentation of legislation and law 
enforcement concerns lack of international legislation which would help to curb 
information security perpetrators globally. One country may have strong legislation 
and with the presence of the internet, offenders have numerous options to operate 
from other countries where there are weak or no regulatory measures against 
information security breaches.  
Information security risk can also be explained by looking at the components that 
it is made up of which include assets, threats, and vulnerability (Adams et al., 
2007). Security threats are circumstances that have the potential to cause loss or 
harm (Pfleeger, 1997). Security threats may come from within and outside the 
organisation (Hinde, 2002). Examples of internal threats are “mistakes by 
employees” (Mitchell, Marcella, & Baxter, 1999) while viruses (De Campeaux, 2002)  
and attacks by hackers (Austin & Darby, 2003) are the most cited types of external 
threats. Associated with security threats are threat-sources. Threat-sources are 
“either an intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of vulnerability 
or a situation and method that may accidentally trigger vulnerability” (Stoneburner 
et al., 2002, p. 12). Common threat-sources are natural (floods, earthquakes, 
tornadoes, landslides, avalanches, and electrical storms), human events that are 
either enabled by or caused by human beings (unintentional acts, inadvertent data 
entry) or deliberate actions (network based attacks, malicious software upload, 
unauthorized access to confidential information), or environmental (long-term 
power failure, pollution, chemicals, liquid leakage). Security vulnerability is a 
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source (Stoneburner et al., 2002). Table 2.1 outlines various threat-sources, their 
motivation and threat actions according to Stoneburner et al (2002). 
Threat sources Motivations Threat actions 
Hacker, cracker  Challenge 
 Ego and rebellion 
 Hacking 
 Social engineering 
 System intrusion 
 Unauthorised system access 
Computer criminal  Destruction of information 
 Illegal information 
disclosure 
 Monetary gain 
 Unauthorized data 
alteration 
 Computer crime (e.g. cyber stalking) 
 Fraudulent act (e.g. replay, impersonation, 
interception) 
 Information bribery 
 Spoofing 
 System intrusion 
Terrorist   Blackmail 
 Destruction 
 Exploitation 
 Revenge  
 Bomb/terrorism 
 Information warfare 
 System attack (e.g. distributed denial of service) 
 System penetration 
 System tampering 
Industrial espionage  Competitive advantage 
 Economic espionage 
 Economic exploitation 
 Information theft 
 Intrusion and personal privacy 
 Unauthorised system access 
Insiders (poorly trained, 
disgruntled, malicious, 
negligent, dishonest, or 
terminated employees 
 Curiosity, ego, revenge 
 Intelligence 
 Monetary gain 
 Unintentional errors and 
omissions 
 Assault on an employee, blackmail 
 Computer abuse, fraud and theft 
 Information bribery 
 Malicious code (e.g. virus, logic bomb, Trojan 
horse) 
 Sale of personal information 
 System bugs, intrusion, and sabotage 
 Unauthorised system access 
Table 2.1: Threat sources, motivation, and threat actions (Stoneburner et al., 2002) 
2.2.3 User contribution to ISR 
Users are weak links to information security and over 50% of the breaches to 
information security originate from within an organisation (Thomson et al., 2006; 
Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Steele & Wargo, 
2007; Chang et al., 2009; Spears & Barki, 2010). Based on industry statistics, 
D’Arcy et al. (2009) account for 50% to 75% of information security incidents as 
perpetrated by users. These are attributed to users’ unauthorised access to 
systems (Gordon et al., 2005), or employee noncompliance with information 
security policies and procedures in an organisation (Pahnila et al., 2007; Siponen & 
Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Chang et al., 2009). In some cases, information security 
incidents occur as a result of employees being mandated by organisational 
activities to circumvent fundamental information security practices in trying to 
have their jobs done (Bednar & Katos, 2009). The pervasiveness, penetration, and 
commercial success of laptops have also amplified the number of security incidents 
as the assumption of physical security gets challenged (Bednar & Katos, 2009). 
These various ways in which users contribute to information security problems 
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The percentage of information security problems originating from within 
organisations however does not correspond to the general corporate information 
security expenditure. Over 75% of corporate information security budgets are 
directed on protecting against outsider threats (Steele & Wargo, 2007). The budgets 
are spent on the acquisition of “anti-virus software, firewalls, intrusion detection 
and prevention systems, anti-spam, logical and physical access control systems, 
malware (spyware) protection, email and database encryption, and web application 
security systems” (Steele & Wargo, 2007). This shows that organisational efforts are 
mostly put on managing information security incidents from external sources at 
the expense of those from within. It is important to have information security 
budgets that are proportional to the magnitude of information security problems 
and at the same time those that address internal threats.  
Studies have shown that users can be important in protecting the information 
security breaches (Chang & Ho, 2006; Siponen, 2005; Spears & Barki, 2010; 
Stanton & Stam, 2006; Whitman, 2008). For instance, Stanton and Stam (2006) 
posit that user behaviour affects the security of information in a sense that if users 
are of good behaviour they carefully handle data and perform their duties as 
expected. If users are of bad behaviour, they facilitate incidences of information 
security breaches. It must be emphasized that it is rather difficult to achieve 100% 
information security (Bodin, Gordon & Loeb, 2008) because users still make 
mistakes (Gordon et al., 2005) and others may be negligent (Chang & Ho, 2006). 
User mistakes are inevitable therefore no matter how minimal it might be 
enterprise information will still be vulnerable to abuse. Organisational efforts to 




2.3 Organisation and information security cultures 
2.3.1 Organisational culture 
Organisational Culture (OC) refers to “shared beliefs and values that develop within 
an organisation and guides the behaviour of its members to maintain suitable 
patterns of social systems” (Lim et al., 2009, p. 89). The main objective of an OC is 
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dynamic and competitive environment (Denison, 1990; Schein, 1992). OC 
facilitates the generation of employee commitment to the organisation. An OC helps 
to bind employees to the organisation by defining accepted standards and rules. It 
acts as a control mechanism that guides and shapes employee attitudes and their 
behaviour (Robbins, 1989). Through an OC, management can communicate their 
intentions to members of staff. 
2.3.2 Information security culture 
A number of definitions for Information Security Culture (ISC) exist in literature. 
For instance, ISC is defined as the patterns of behaviour within an organisation 
which contribute to the protection of information (Dhillon, 1997). ISC is also 
defined as anything that is done in relation to information security practices 
(Martins & Eloff, 2002; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010). Realizing the importance of ISC, 
several researchers recommend ISC to be incorporated in users’ daily activities 
(Schlienger & Teufel, 2003; Thomson et al., 2006; Von Solms, 2000). While 
enterprise-level ISC influence proper use of information systems at an 
organisational level, arguments in literature suggest that ISC should not only be 
confined to organisational boundaries. An ideal ISC is suggested to also include its 
possible interactions with national cultures (Leidner & Kayworth, 2006). It is 
therefore important to understand how these cross-culture interactions influence 
people behaviour towards ISRM practices.  
2.4 Information Security Risk Management (ISRM) 
Stoneburner et al (2002, p. 1) define ISRM as “the process of identifying risk, 
assessing risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level”. Several other 
authors have defined ISRM such as follows:  
“…understanding information security requirements, establishing security policy 
and objectives for information security, implementing and operating controls to 
manage information security risks, monitoring and reviewing the performance 
and effectiveness of them and continuous improving” (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005). 
“…the overall activities, processes, and institutions for identification, analysis, 
control and monitoring of risks that arise in the context of information 
management or by using information technology” (Jahner & Krcmar, 2005, p. 
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These definitions imply that ISRM involves continuously monitoring, reviewing, and 
improving the information security policies, activities, processes and operating 
controls and implementing new information security controls in order to maintain 
the integrity of enterprise information.  
The Information Systems and Control Association (ISACA) also define ISRM as a 
process of identifying vulnerabilities and threats to the information resources that 
belong to an organisation. ISRM involves deciding on countermeasures which 
reduce risk to a level that is acceptable to the organisation which is also referred to 
as risk mitigation. It is a continuous process involving identification as well as 
monitoring of information security controls that address those risks. ISRM enables 
IT Managers to balance the operational and economic costs of protective measures 
and achieve gains in mission capability by protecting the IT systems and data that 
support organisation’s missions (Stoneburner et al., 2002, p. 4). The main concepts 
in these definitions of ISRM include the identification or determination of risks to 
information resources, the identification of countermeasures which reduce or 
mitigate the risks to the level considered as acceptable to the organisation and the 
monitoring of the performance of the existing countermeasures. These three themes 
form the three core processes of ISRM named as Risk Assessment, Risk Mitigation 
and Monitoring and Assessment (Stoneburner et al., 2002) presented in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: ISRM Process (Stoneburner et al., 2002). 
(a) Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment helps to determine the extent of the potential threat and the 
risk associated with an IS asset. It is used to identify appropriate information 
security controls for reducing or eliminating risk during the mitigation process. 
Information security controls are countermeasures which are planned to 
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reducing or mitigating the risks to the level acceptable to the organisation. 
Information security controls can either be technical such as encryption 
mechanisms or nontechnical controls such as security policies (Stoneburner et 
al., 2002). The risk assessment process involves a number of sub processes 
which include system characterisation, threat identification, vulnerability 
identification, controls analysis, likelihood determination, impact analysis, risk 
determination, and control recommendation (Stoneburner et al., 2002).  
(b) Risk Mitigation 
This involves prioritizing, evaluating and implementing the appropriate 
information security controls as recommended in the risk assessment process. 
Sub-processes under the risk mitigation process include risk assumption, risk 
avoidance, risk limitation, risk planning, research and acknowledgement, and 
risk transference (Stoneburner et al., 2002). 
In risk assumption, an organisation acknowledges the existence of potential risk 
and continues to operate the systems or chooses to implement controls with an 
aim of mitigating the risk to an acceptable level (Stoneburner et al., 2002). In 
risk avoidance, an organisation completely avoids the risk by eliminating the 
cause and its consequences. A typical example of risk avoidance is forgoing 
some system functionality or completely shutting down the system when risk is 
identified. In risk limitation, an organisation implements controls that minimise 
the adverse impact of a threat which exploits vulnerability. An example of risk 
limitation is use of preventive or detective controls such as anti-spyware and 
antivirus software. In risk planning, an organisation develops a risk mitigation 
plan which prioritizes, implements, and maintains controls. In research and 
acknowledgement, an organisation lowers risk by acknowledging the 
vulnerability and identifies controls to correct the vulnerability. In risk 
transference, an organisation transfers the risk by using other options to 
compensate for loss such as insurance cover (Stoneburner et al., 2002). 
(c) Evaluation and assessment 
Often times, computer networks get expanded and updated, its components get 
changed, and software applications get replaced or updated with newer 
versions. In addition, personnel changes occur and information security policies 
change over time (Stoneburner et al., 2002). These changes imply that new risks 
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process to be an on-going process and always evolving. Success of ISRM 
program relies on senior management commitment, full support and 
participation of the IT technical personnel, the competence of the risk 
assessment team, the awareness and cooperation of members of the user 
community and an on-going evaluation and assessment of the IT-related 
mission risks (Stoneburner et al., 2002). 
The most critical element of ISRM is information security awareness. Wilson and 
Hash (2003) define security awareness as the process of making users aware of 
information security risks. The aim of information security awareness is to focus 
user attention on security and to allow the users to recognize security concerns 
and respond accordingly. Literature focuses on user awareness and education 
when addressing the human aspects of information security. According to Bednar 
and Katos (2009), literature does not address issues of relevance and motivation 
which are some of the important human aspects information security. Bednar and 
Katos (2009) suggest that an ISRM system needs to accommodate end-users’ 
information security requirements. This may imply that efforts aimed at addressing 
the human aspects of information security should consider human factors beyond 
information security requirements. One way to achieve this is by understanding the 
cultural influence on human behaviour such as user participation in ISRM 
practices. 
2.4.1 User participation in ISRM 
User behaviour has important implications on organisation’s information security 
management efforts (Lim et al., 2009). Stan (2007) posits that ideal ISC highly 
depends on the users’ information security related beliefs and values. These beliefs 
and values get manifested in user actions and behaviours towards ISRM practices. 
In order to effectively manage information security, organisations need to carefully 
think of ways of influencing user behaviours. One way to influence user behaviour 
is by having information security policies. However, well-structured information 
security policies become dead documents if users are not made aware of (Siponen, 
2000a). Further, information security policies do not help reduce information 
security incidents if they are not complied with (Doherty & Fulford, 2005). It is 
important for users to understand their respective roles and responsibilities and be 
able to build work practices based on their clear understanding of these roles and 
responsibilities (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). User work practices enable the users 
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importance of user responsibility, therefore, instil an ISC which enables the users 
to know their roles and responsibilities (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). While 
accountability means accepting blame for some information security incidents, 
being responsible means being able to take appropriate action during future 
information security events (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). An ISC in an 
organisation helps to instil a culture of responsibility among the users and makes 
them to respond accordingly to future information security incidents.  
Furthermore, literature suggests an ISC in organisation which transcends both 
organisational and national boundaries (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Bednar & 
Katos, 2009). Due to network externalities and other impediments to information 
security, organisations cannot be secure if ISCs are limited by organisation 
boundaries. Such ISCs would not guide the behaviour of users who access 
information from external sources through the internet. They would also not 
protect the organisations when customers operating from insecure environments 
access enterprise information through the internet.  
Secondly, organisations need to establish ways of maintaining and upholding the 
integrity of new members to the organisations. Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) argue 
that a person of integrity does not always remain so. Hence users’ failure to 
maintain their integrity due to changes in individual pressures, marital statuses, 
financial, and medical problems result in users’ integrity being compromised. As a 
result of loss of integrity, over 50% of the information security incidents originate 
from the users within the organisation (Gordon et al., 2005; D’Arcy et al., 2009). 
Organisations which strategically aim at maintaining information security establish 
ways of maintaining user integrity. One possible way to maintaining user integrity 
in an organisation is by instituting informal security systems such as ISC which 
come free (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). Organisationally grounded principles and 
values are essential for managing information security (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006) 
Thirdly, culture promotes user trustworthiness (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999, p. 1540) defines the word “trust” as “the state of 
being responsible for something”. Users need to demonstrate a sense of self-control 
and responsibility. This, together with less external control and supervision, 
creates mutual systems of trust amongst the users (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). 
User supervision is not feasible in organisations which span wide geographical 
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& Backhouse, 2000). Culture helps build user trust through shared ethics and 
beliefs among the members of the organisation. Through an ISC users are trusted 
to be responsible and to discharge their duties in accordance with the laid down 
information security policies without requiring close supervision (Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh, 2006).  
Lastly, culture promotes ethicality among the users. Ethicality, according to the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999, p. 490) refers to “a state of maintaining moral 
principles of conduct or informal norms of behaviour”. While organisational rules 
can be applied to all formalized procedures, there are circumstances where there 
are simply no rules. For instance, there are no rules that govern Internet usage but 
there are working norms which have developed the syntax for internet 
communications. Similarly, informal norms exist in organisations which control the 
behaviour of users (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000).  
Considering these different characteristics of users which are culturally motivated, 
literature suggests the need for organisations to understand the effect of cultural 
differences. This would enable organisations to successfully deploy global IT 
solutions or effectively manage information security (Harris & Davidson, 1999; 
Myers & Tan, 2002; Tan, Watson, & Wei, 1995). Successful IT systems 
implementation in one country does not guarantee success in another country with 
different national cultures. In the context of ISRM, culture makes people from 
different cultural origins to respond differently to the same ISRM practices. One 
country’s success of ISRM strategy does not imply success of another country for 
the same ISRM practice. It is necessary for cross-country organisations to consider 
the influence of natio al cultures (Chow, Kato & Shields, 1994) or human factor 
(Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010) when implementing organisation-wide 
information security policies in order to be assured of effective ISRM. Literature 
identifies three mechanisms through which culture shapes the impacts of IS (Pang, 
Sharma, Lederman, & Dreyfus, 2010), which have been presented in Table 2.2.  
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On social interpretation of IS, Pang et al. (2010) posit that users assign socially 
constructed meanings to developed software. These meanings are usually different 
from those of the development team (Pang et al., 2010). Culture shapes the social 
interpretational processes and depending on the existing culture, the same piece of 
technology or ISRM strategy can be interpreted differently in different countries. 
The same IS technology which can be viewed as “empowering or deskilling, as 
reducing or enlarging existing power distance and as restrictive or liberalising” 
(Pang et al., 2010, p. 2) may not be viewed as such in another country. Therefore, 
the users’ interpretation of ISRM practices is critical on their willingness to accept, 
adopt and use it (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002; Gobbin, 1998).  
The second mechanism of how culture shapes the impacts of IS involves response 
to uncertainties. Culture defines the rules that influence the way people respond to 
change and the associated uncertainty (Johns, Murphy Smith, & Strand, 2003). 
Some cultures are more tolerant to uncertainties with characteristics such as open, 
flexible, and sociable while others are not (Cooper, 1994; Doherty & Perry, 2001). 
People in more tolerant cultures are expected to be more receptive to changes in 
ISRM practices as opposed to those in cultures that are not tolerant. User social 
characteristics such as “open”, “flexible”, and “sociable” influence their 
participation in ISRM practices. Users that are flexible, due to the existing tolerant 
cultures are expected to participate more in ISRM practices. This would contribute 
more to the management of information security. 
The third mechanism of how culture shapes the impact of IS or ISRM relates to 
functional fitness. Functional fitness refers to the ability of IS or ISRM to meet the 
requirements of different users within specific cultures. Pang et al (2010) posit that 
functional misfit is a common phenomenon in cross-cultural IS transfer projects. 
ISRM functional misfits can therefore be expected amongst users from different 
cultural origins. While users in one country may consider some ISRM practices as 
appropriate, users in another country, with different national cultures, may regard 
the same as inappropriate (Pang et al., 2010). Sharing of system access details 
might be unethical in some countries but can be viewed as ethical in countries 
where national cultures promote sharing of resources. This would result in some 
ISRM practices turning out to be inefficient in some countries while being efficient 
in other countries. Cultural characteristics, therefore, need to be considered when 
embarking on cross-cultural IS transfer projects or when adopting cross-cultural 
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peoples’ attitude and behaviour towards ISRM practices is also essential for 
information security management efforts that are aimed at effectively moderating 
multi-cultural or multi-national information security threats. This is important in 
the world of diversity and globalization where information security risks are 
evolving along different complex dimensions. 
ISRM consists of many processes and practices which are largely dependent on 
human cooperated behaviour (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010). Inadequate level of 
user cooperation and knowledge about information security requirements makes 
many information security management techniques to become liable to abuse or 
misinterpretation by users. Therefore, organisations need to comprehensively 
address the “human factor” element when managing information security (Van 
Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010). Literature advocates for the need for an information 
security culture in the organisations in order to efficiently manage information 
security (Eloff & Von Solms, 2000; Von Solms, 2000) as well as a culture which 
transcends organisational and national boundaries (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; 
Bednar & Katos, 2009).  
According to the participation theories of buy-in, system quality and emergent 
interactions (Barki & Hartwick, 1989; Barki & Hartwick, 1994; Markus & Mao, 
2004; Spears, 2006; Spears & Barki, 2010), user participation is suggested to 
contribute positively to ISRM efforts. However, the user positive contribution to 
information security management can be ensured through an information security 
culture, which makes the users to become an information security asset rather 
than a risk (Van Niekerk & Von Solms, 2010). Being an information security asset 
means users becoming part of the solution towards addressing information security 
breaches. Information security assets, the detailed knowledge of business 
processes that users possess can be essential when identifying information security 
risks (Spears, 2006; Spears & Barki, 2010). Risk identification is the first step of 
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Figure 2.3: Model of Consultative Participation (Spears, 2006) 
The model of consultative participation by Spears (2006) presented in Figure 2.3 
theorizes the much advocated inclusion of business users in the information 
security risk analysis process (Suh & Han, 2003). In the model, consultative 
participation is expected to enhance information security posture. These are 
mediated by three factors: information quality, participant involvement and 
knowledge transfer among peers (Spears, 2006). In consultative participation, users 
are assigned roles and activities to perform but they do not have complete decision 
making authority in whatever takes place (Spears, 2006). Participant involvement is 
the subjective psychological state reflecting the importance and personal relevance 
of an object or event (Hartwick & Barki, 1994). Information quality refers to the 
extent to which information is complete, relevant, believable, and timely (Wang & 
Strong, 1996; Zmud, 1978). Knowledge transfer refers to the exchange of 
information between end users and information security staff while the information 
security posture refers to the combination of all (security policy, procedures, and 
technology, and ISRM projects) (Spears, 2006). If the knowledge transferred 
between end-users and information security staff would be used in the design and 
development of information security controls, the developed information security 
controls would be efficient (Spears & Barki, 2010).  
The model of consultative participation links user participation with information 
security posture mediated by information quality and participant involvement. In 
consultative participation, users with detailed knowledge of business processes 
participate in information security risk analysis to identify information security 
vulnerabilities (Spears, 2006). The identification of unknown information security 
risks increases the quality of information used for ISRM. This is consistent with the 
system quality theory of user participation (Markus & Mao, 2004). It is expected 
that the increased quality of information used in ISRM would be used to design and 
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According to Spears (2006), user awareness about information security contributes 
to the improvement in information security development and remediation. As the 
users get to know more about the need and requirement of information security, 
they would be more willing to pass the information that they possess about 
business processes to information security control development staff. This 
information would be used to design and develop high quality information security 
controls. This would result in improvement in the overall information security 
control performance. Improvement in information security control performance 
implies improvement in information security management. The information that 
the users pass on to the information security control developers can also be used to 
remediate (improve) the existing controls that are identified during risk 
identification as weak to detect the presence of threats and prevent their impact.  
There are three areas of ISRM in which end users can participate: ISRM activities, 
accountability roles and security control roles (Spears & Barki, 2010). These areas 
have been presented in Table 2.3. Control identification involves “the identification 
of potential threat-sources and compiling a threat statement which outlines all 
threat-sources that are applicable to the information resource which is currently 
being evaluated (Stoneburner et al., 2002).  
ISRM activities Accountability roles Security controls 
 Business process 
workflow 
 Information security 
control identification 
 Control design, 
implementation, testing, 
and remediation 
 Control communication 
 Documenting roles and 
responsibilities 
 Assigning roles and 
responsibilities 
 Designating control 
owners 
 Security policy 
committee membership 
 System access control 
 Segregation of duties 
 Alerts and triggers 
 Exception reports 
 End-user computing 
 Training  
 Risk tolerance 
Table 2.3: User participation roles (Spears & Barki, 2010) 
Control design involves development of new controls that are aimed at preventing 
threat-sources from exploiting the existing vulnerabilities in the information 
resources. Control remediation refers to the improvement to the existing controls 
which are identified as weak to perform their intended purposes (Stoneburner et 
al., 2002). The Control Objectives for Information and related Technologies (COBIT) 
defines controls as: 
“Policies, procedures, practices and organisational structures designed to provide 
reasonable assurance that business objectives will be achieved and that undesired 
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Having an information security policy in an organisation is just one step towards 
ISRM. More to it is about getting the users to know about it. User compliance with 
the information security policy is also an issue of concern in many organisations. 
Having information security policies in place does not guarantee reduction of 
information security incidents (Doherty & Fulford, 2005) and an information 
security policy which users are not made aware is a dead document (Siponen, 
2000a). The other reason which makes organisations to still suffer high rates of 
information security incidents despite having a good policy document is its 
enforcement. Having an information security policy and being able to enforce it are 
totally different things (David, 2002). No statistically significant relationships exist 
between the adoption of information security policies and the number of 
information security incidences (Doherty & Fulford, 2005). Having realised the need 
for compliance with information security policies, universities seek measures such 
as self-regulations, staff/student handbooks, and public relation campaigns. These 
make members of staff and students to become aware of the information security 
policies. Failure of which may result in financial loss or damage to reputation 
(Kyobe, 2010).  
Information security controls that are often associated with users in many 
organisations, include segregation of duties, and access control (Spears & Barki, 
2010). Segregation of duties is an internal control that prevents or detects errors 
and irregularities by assigning responsibility for initiating and recording 
transactions and custody of assets to separate individuals. Segregation of duties 
prevents one user from initiating and completing a task in a business process 
cycle. This, in a process, prevents fraud and error by preventing conflict of interests 
of a particular user which results in breach of security (ISACA, 2008). 
In addition to access control and segregation of duties, users are also involved in 
enacting exception reports and definition of security alerts. Exception reports are 
used to signify potential problems in a particular application based on pre-defined 
conditions (ISACA, 2008) while accountability is a security goal that generates the 
requirement for actions on an entity to be traced uniquely to that entity. 
Accountability supports nonrepudiation, deterrence, fault isolation, intrusion 
detection and prevention, and after-action recovery and legal action. Accountability 
is described as responsibilities assumed by users when they are assigned tasks 
and roles which aim at safeguarding information assets. Accountability roles 
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Typical examples of such tasks include approving routine access control, data 
custodianship, access control specialist, and data owner responsibility (Spears & 
Barki, 2010).  
Access control as one of the ISRM practices ensures that users have access to 
information resources in accordance with the defined security control policies 
(ISACA, 2008). The effectiveness and strength of access controls depends on the 
correctness of the access control decisions. Data custodians are individuals who 
design, develop, and operate the data warehouse (Giannoccaro, Shanks, & Darke, 
1999). The data custodianship role ensures that data is accessed and used only for 
the intended purposes. Data owners (consumers) are those who use the data in 
their work activities. 
The above discussion about user participation in ISRM shows that user behaviours 
have an important role in ensuring the efficient management of information 
security. This finding from literature was further examined in this study by testing 
the hypothesis 
H1: User participation in ISRM contributes to effective information 
security management  
2.4.2 National culture and ISRM practices 
While argued not to hold after over 30 years, Hofstede’s conceptualisation of 
national culture is popularly used in IS discipline (McCoy, Galletta & King, 2005). 
Hofstede (1980, p. 260) defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one human group from another”. This 
definition and many others rely on the assumption that individuals’ membership in 
cultural groups defines the nature of values that the individuals espouse. This may 
not always be true since an individual’s values can be influenced and modified by 
the individual’s membership in other professional organizations, ethnic, religious 
and various social groups (Straub et al., 2002). This suggests the inappropriateness 
of the assumption of homogeneity “particularly if the national culture construct is 
to be integrated into IS models that reflect individual behaviour.  
Contrary to IS models, integration of national culture constructs into ISRM models 
justifies the assumption of homogeneity. Information security management is not 
only a matter of technology but also people management which is influenced by 
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culture influences people’s beliefs and expectations which may lead to information 
security breaches. For instance, Schneier (2008) and Komatsu (2008) posit that 
people’s expectations may be one of the causes of misjudgement on how to react to 
information security incidents. It is therefore natural to think that culture 
influences people’s behaviour especially in cross-cultural environments (Asai et al., 
2009). Chow et al. (1994) also posit that the behaviour and attitude of people over 
same management practices varies with national culture. 
On another perspective of national culture, regions aim at harmonizing 
telecommunications policies across member states through development of regional 
model policies which member states can use to develop their national policies. 
According to the complex adaptive systems theory (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000), 
adaptive policies can be generated through adaptive policymaking processes which 
would enable rapid response to technological change. According to PREM (2010), 
regulation needs to take technology into account since openness to trade brings in 
new technologies hence new changes. Changes to the existing systems environment 
(e.g. expansion in network connectivity, introduction of new technologies) call for 
information security professionals to identify and assess new potential risks 
(Stoneburner et al., 2002). The new potential risks call for a review of information 
security management strategies which may result in new information security 
controls being developed or existing ones requiring remediation in order to 
safeguard their IT systems. 
A part from harmonizing telecommunications policies, Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) such as the European Union (EU), the Southern African 
Development Commu ity (SADC), and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) also need to foster member states integration through ISRM policy 
harmonization. This would instil information security culture among regional 
member states. There is lack of policy harmonization in RECs such as Southern 
African Development Committee (SADC) is evidenced by different member states 
acting in isolation. South Africa enacted the ECT act in 2002 with an aim of 
regulating and protecting electronic transactions (Kyobe, 2009; Michalsons, 2005) 
while Malawi’s current Communication Act of 1998 mainly focuses on regulating 
postal and broadcast services (Manda, 2010) and Zimbabwe is in the process of 
putting together a new ICT policy which is aimed at overhauling the old ICT policy 
which was drafted in 2005 (Moyo, 2012). Lack of coordinated efforts in the 
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attacks. Wang and Kim (2009) establish that coordinated efforts in information 
security management reduce cyber-attacks originating from other countries by 16 
to 25%.  
The danger of different cultures on implementing coordinated information security 
management strategies is that people in different countries may view and perceive 
the coordinated information security management efforts differently. While users in 
some countries may regard some information security concerns as appropriate and 
requiring action, users in other countries may regard the same information security 
concerns as inappropriate due to differences in their cultural characteristics. This 
would result in RECs member states having different information security 
management strategies and acting in isolation. Member states with weak 
information security management strategies would provide good grounds for 
information security perpetrators to operate from (Wang & Kim, 2009). Cultural 
characteristics which influence user behaviour (hence participation) towards ISRM, 
therefore, need to be understood in order to have effective coordinated information 
security management efforts. 
Differences in user participation in ISRM practices may be attributed to factors 
such as socio-economic conditions and government ICT polices (Brown, Hoppe, 
Mugera, Newman, & Stander, 2004) as well as attitudinal and behavioural factors 
(Tan & Teo, 2000). However, national culture, as discussed above, may also be one 
important factor that influences user participation in ISRM practices. Culture, 
according to Hofstede (1980), influences user attitude and behaviour. Therefore, 
culture can be suggested as one of the factors attributed to the differences in user 
participation in ISRM between countries. This study further examined this cultural 
influence on user participation in ISRM between the two countries by testing the 
hypothesis 
H2: User participation in ISRM practices is the same in South Africa 
and Malawi 
2.5 Research contextualisation 
This study was a comparative of South Africa and Malawi aimed at understanding 
how user participation in ISRM contributes to the management of information 
security. Studies have shown that people from different cultural background 
demonstrate different attitudes and behaviours towards ISRM practices (Chow et 
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Malawi which have experienced post-apartheid culture (Oosthuizen & Bhorat, 
2004) and a 31-year of autocratic rule (Forster, 1994) respectively. This is 
important as it would establish the grounds to base interdependent information 
security management efforts amongst countries (Wang & Kim, 2009) which would 
deter information security threats globally.  
2.6 Lessons learnt from literature review 
The literature review demonstrated that national cultures influence user attitude 
and their behaviour towards ISRM practices. Differences in national cultures are 
reflected in the different user attitudes and participation in ISRM practices. These 
subsequently yield different outcomes on the overall management of information 
security. Literature highlights the need to have ISC instilled which transcends both 
organisational as well as national boundaries as a way of promoting responsibility, 
integrity, trustworthiness, and ethicality among the users in the organisations 
(Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). 
The literature review recommends organisations to take an effort to understand 
national cultures of the countries that they conduct business with if they are to be 
assured of successful information security management strategies and policies. 
This is also true for organisations that aim at deploying global IT solutions. 
Successful implementations of IT solutions depend on user participation which is a 
reflection of national cultures. The literature review also demonstrated the need for 
interdependent ISRM efforts. Interdependent information security helps 
governments to deter cyber-attacks which originate from other countries. 
2.7 Conceptual model 
A conceptual model is a set of propositions or statements which represent 
relationships among constructs (Finne, 2000). The study was guided by the 
conceptual model presented in Figure 2.4. The model reflects three domains: 
Information Security Culture (ISC) elements, its outcomes, and reflective or 
underlying factors. While Spears and Barki (2010) mainly focused on user 
participation roles in ISRM, Lim et al. (2009) identify ISC elements which were 
integrated into the conceptual model (Figure 2.4). This study not only focused on 
understanding how user participation in ISRM practices contributes to the efficient 
information security management but also attempted to understand how national 
culture influences user attitude and behaviour towards ISRM practices. In 
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their observable behaviours and factors. Together, the ISC elements result in ISC 
outcomes which were measured using the reflective factors.  
Data collected in the study was used to assess whether ISC existed in the 
respective organisations for the study participants. For instance, to ascertain that 
ISC existed, participants were expected to provide information which was indicative 
of user participation, commitment, motivation, and awareness about organisational 
information security management. This was based on Lim et al. (2009) who posit 
that users within an organisation with fully instilled ISC undergo periodic 
information security training programmes or awareness campaigns. ISC provides 
users with a sense of ownership to the information security practices. ISC makes 
the users to feel responsible and become committed towards information security. 
The users also know what to do, who to report to when faced with information 
security problems (Lim et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 2.4: Conceptual Model (Spears & Barki, 2010; Lim et al., 2009) 
2.7.1 Behavioural characteristics of ISC  
Many researchers have highlighted the importance for organisations to understand 
and instil an ISC (Oost & Chew, 2007; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003; Thomson et al., 
2006; Von Solms, 2000; Vroom & Von Solms, 2004). For instance, Von Solms 
(2000, p. 618) suggests “a culture of information security to be created in a country 
by instilling the aspects of information security to every user of ICTs as a natural 
way of performing his or her daily job”. In addition, Schlienger and Teufel (2003) 
call for security culture to be instilled in organisations to support all daily 
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recommend that ISC is an important factor in ensuring the efficient management of 
information security.  
There are three elements of ISC which are beliefs, actions and behaviour. In 
relation to information security, these elements are observed in five different user-
centric behavioural factors of responsibility, participation, commitment, motivation, 
and awareness (Lim et al., 2009). These behavioural factors were used to formulate 
the conceptual model presented in Figure 2.4. 
a) Responsibility 
As it can be noted from the conceptual model (Figure 2.4), user responsibility 
is the first observable characteristic of ISC. The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
(1999, p. 1220) defines responsibility as “the ability to act independently and 
take decisions without authorization”. Users that are responsible have the 
ability to handle and act accordingly when information security incidents 
occur (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). New circumstances which may arise 
require users to take charge of them and act appropriately. The questionnaire 
consisted items which required the study participants to provide information 
which was reflective of the users’ accountability and responsibility. 
b) Participation 
The second observable characteristic of ISC as reflected in the conceptual 
model in Figure 2.4 is user participation. Spears and Barki (2010) suggests 
three areas of user participation concerned with the management of 
information security. User participation in ISRM process activities include 
activities that users perform as part of the ISRM process. Users also perform 
routine activities that are part of information security control. The third area 
of user participation is through accountability roles (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003). 
These three areas which constitute user participation are simply formative 
indicators (Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003). 
c) Commitment 
Drawn from the conceptualization of commitment from social exchange, 
marriage and organisations (Cook & Emerson, 1978; Meyer & Allen, 1984; 
Thompson & Spanier, 1983), Morgan and Hunt (1994) define relationship 
commitment as exchange beliefs where each partner believes that an on-going 
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maintaining it. In the context of information security management, committed 
users realize the need for information security management and believe that it 
is worth taking part to ensure that it endures indefinitely. When commitment 
and trust are both present, they produce outcomes that promote efficiency, 
productivity, and effectiveness. Commitment and trust lead directly to 
cooperative behaviours that are conducive to relationship marketing success 
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994). 
d) Motivation 
The study of motivation involves asking “why people initiate, terminate, and 
persist in specific actions in particular circumstances” (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). A response to this question is based on some type of internal, 
individually rooted need or motive. The motive can be to enhance one's self-
esteem, to achieve, to affiliate, to avoid cognitive conflict, or to self-actualize. 
These various types of motives are assumed to be part of the unique, internal 
core of a person's self-system (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). While no particular 
items were precisely structured to assess users’ observable characteristics of 
motivation towards information security management, items which measured 
user accountability and responsibility, were closely related to user motivation. 
e) Awareness 
Information security awareness is “a state that is reflected in the behaviour of 
the target groups such as users (Spears & Barki, 2010). It is associated with a 
raised consciousness (Dinev & Hu, 2007) and an increased adoption of 
information security policies and countermeasures (Tsohou, Kokolakis, 
Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2008). Two elements are reflective of increased user 
awareness about information security and these are: 
a. heightened awareness of policies, procedures, and need for information 
security 
b. users demonstrated sense of ownership in maintaining information 
security 
2.7.2 ISC outcomes 
The conceptual model reflects five ISC outcomes: information security control 
development, information security control performance, information security 
control practices, accountability and responsibility, and information security 
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organisations face depending on the level of integration of ISC and OC. Fitzgerald 
(2007) classifies levels of integration of ISC and OC into high, moderate and low as 
presented in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4: ISC and OC integration characteristics (Fitzgerald, 2007) 
High level of ISC and OC integration refers to a state where ISC is fully embedded 
in OC (Fitzgerald, 2007; Schlienger & Teufel, 2003; Von Solms, 2000). High level of 
integration of OC and ISC results in organisations having a number of attributes: 
lowest information security incidents originating from the users, high information 
security costs (Lim et al., 2009), high integrity, responsible, trustworthy and 
ethicality of users (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000) who are information security 
cautious. This is different from both moderate and low level of integration as it can 
be noted from Table 2.4.  
2.7.3 Underlying or reflective factors 
The conceptual model presented in Figure 2.4 also shows observable 
characteristics which are indicative of the ISC outcomes. For instance, the model 
shows three underlying factors which are reflective of information security 
practices. These, among many others include access control, segregation of duties 
and compliance with information security policies (Spears & Barki, 2010; Lim et al., 
2009). Survey participants were asked to indicate whether users in their respective 
organisations participate in these reflective factors.  
2.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has discussed the concept of user participation and also identifies the 
three user participation theories: buy-in, system quality, and emergent interactions 
theory, which explain the concept of user participation and how this influences 
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introduces the reader to the concepts of OC and ISC which build the base for 
subsequent discussion of information security and ISRM. The chapter also 
discusses the two images of users in the context of information security. The study 
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Chapter 3 : Research design 
This chapter outlines the research design employed in the study as follows:  
Chapter 3 is organized into five sections. Section 3.1 revisits the problem statement, 
research questions, research aims and objectives, and the research methodology. 
Section 3.2 discusses the philosophical assumptions that guided the way in which 
the study was conducted. Section 3.3 outlines the research methodology which in it 
are discussions pertaining to the purpose of the study, type of investigation 
employed, research method, a description of the participants, sampling method, 
survey instruments, data collection and analysis. Section 3.4 presents the time frame 
in which the study was conducted as well as the deliverables expected. Section 3.5 




The previous chapter outlined two main problem areas. Firstly, there are 
contradicting views about how user participation in ISRM contributes to the 
management of information security. Secondly, studies which focus on 
understanding cultural influence on user behaviour (participation) towards ISRM 
practices are rare. To address these problems, two research questions were used to 
guide the study: how user participation in ISRM contributes to the efficient 
management of information security and how the effect of user participation in 
ISRM varies across nations of different cultural origins. A mixed research approach 
was deemed appropriate where both quantitative and qualitative methods were 
employed to collect, analyse and interpret data.  
3.2 Philosophical assumptions  
One way to classify research is to distinguish between the philosophical 
assumptions that guide the research (Myers, 2009). A research philosophy is a set 
of beliefs that guides the way of conducting research (Guba, 1990). The most 
pertinent philosophical assumptions in the field of IS relate to epistemology (Myers, 
2009, p. 35). Epistemology is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999, p. 
480) as “the theory of knowledge”, especially with regard to its methods, validity 
and scope and also as the assumptions about knowledge and how it is acquired 
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While some authors suggest three research paradigms: positivist, interpretive, and 
critical (Chua, 1986; Myers, 2009; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991), others identify 
four paradigms: positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994) or post-positivism, constructivism, and advocacy 
(participatory), and pragmatic (Creswell, 2009). This varied classification of 
epistemologies is dependent on the discipline under study, beliefs held by the 
advisers and the faculty under which a particular research belongs (Creswell, 
2009). While the three-fold distinction of epistemologies is just one of the many 
classifications, it has widely been embraced in IS literature (Klein & Myers, 1999; 
Myers, 2009; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997; Richardson, 2007; Stahl & Brooke, 2008) 
hence adopted in this study. 
3.2.1 Positivist research  
Positivist studies are founded on the “existence of a priori fixed relationships within 
phenomena” (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p. 5). Positivist researchers believe that 
“reality” exists, which can objectively be measured or observed (Myers, 2009). 
Positivist studies assume the existence of “cause and effect” relationships which 
need to be identified and assessed. The problems studied in positivist studies 
reflect the need to identify and assess the causes that influence outcomes. These 
cause and effect relationships are also referred to as fixed relationships (Orlikowski 
& Baroudi, 1991). The fixed relationships are investigated using structured 
instruments such as questionnaires (Myers, 2009; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
Knowledge in positivist studies is based on careful observation and measurement of 
the objective reality. Positivists also assume the existence of laws and theories that 
govern the world which need to be tested, verified or refined. In positivist studies, 
researchers begin with the identification of theory and then the collection of data 
that either support or refute the theory. Necessary revisions to the theory are made 
before subsequent tests are made (Creswell, 2009). 
3.2.2 Interpretive research 
Interpretive researchers assume that “the knowledge of reality is gained only 
through social constructions such a language, consciousness, shared meanings, 
documents, tools, and other artefacts” (Klein & Myers, 1999, p. 69). Interpretive 
research helps researchers to get to know human thought and action in social and 
organisational contexts. Interpretive studies develop knowledge based on the 
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the world (Creswell, 2009). The main aim of interpretive research is to understand 
rather than predict (Walsham, 2006).  
 
Table 3.1: Principles that guide interpretive research in IS (Klein & Myers, 1999) 
From an interpretive perspective, the subjects themselves (the people) construct 
their own understanding and attach meanings to objects and things of the world 
they live in (Lee & Lings, 2008). Interpretive research is conducted under the 
guidance of seven principles or fundamental guidelines (Klein & Myers, 1999) as 
outlined in Table 3.1. Interpretive researchers seek to understand phenomena by 
accessing the already existing meanings that participants in the phenomena assign 
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3.2.3 Critical research 
Critical research is to a larger extent similar to interpretive research in its 
epistemological assumptions (Myers, 2009). Critical researchers assume social 
reality is historically constituted and that it can be produced and reproduced by 
the people themselves. The people’s ability to change their social and economic 
circumstances is constrained by forms of social, cultural and political domination 
(Myers & Klein, 2011). Critical researchers also believe that not all interpretations 
are given equal weight in a particular social setting. Some interpretations are 
preferred over others while others may be imposed by one person or a group of 
people (Myers, 2009). A critical research paradigm assumes that interpretations 
that individuals who are socially, culturally or politically powerful make are either 
preferred or imposed among the members in a social setting.  
Myers and Klein (2011) suggest three elements of critical research: insight, critique, 
and transformation. Insight is concerned with interpretation. The element of 
critique is “concerned with critique, the genealogy of knowledge, and the social 
practices of control and reproduction” and that of transformation is concerned with 
“suggesting improvements to the conditions of human existence, existing social 
arrangements, and social theories” (Myers & Klein, 2011, p. 24).  
There are six fundamental guidelines or principles for conducting critical research 
classified into two elements: critique (the principle of using core concepts from 
critical social theories, the principle of taking a value position, and the principle of 
revealing and challenging prevailing beliefs and social practices) and 
transformation (the principle of individual emancipation, the principle of 
improvements in society, and the principle of improvements in social theories) 
(Myers & Klein, 2011). 
Based on Fitzgerald and Howcroft (1998) who demonstrate that any epistemological 
stance can be employed based the preferences of the researcher and more 
importantly based on the purpose of the research, a positivist paradigm was 
preferred over the interpretive and critical paradigms. This study assumed that 
knowledge can be discovered and verified through direct observations or 
measurements (Krauss, 2005; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991) which, in turn, 
characterised the study as positivist. While positivist studies are conducted usually 
to test theories (Myers, 2009), the aim of the study was to understand the effect of 
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Closely related to epistemology is ontology. Borrowed from field of philosophy where 
it refers to a systematic account of existence, the term “ontology” refers to an 
explicit specification of a conceptualization (Gruber, 1993) or simply the nature of 
reality (Migiro & Magangi, 2011). Lee and Lings (2008, p. 11, 59) also define 
ontology as “the belief about the nature of reality”. Gruber (1993) posits that only 
what exists in knowledge-based systems, is exactly what can be represented. From 
an ontological perspective, research falls into two groups: realism and objectivism 
(Fitzgerald & Howcroft, 1998). While realism research assumes reality exists 
independent of the mind, objective research assumes reality may be unconscious of 
its surrounding (Crotty, 1998). The ontological position adopted in this study 
recognizes the existence of reality which is separate from the subjective 
understanding of individuals (Gregor, 2002). This therefore qualified this study as 
realist study. This was based on the assumption that user participation in ISRM 
can be observed or assessed objectively and independent of the observer. 
3.3 Research methodology 
3.3.1 Purpose of the study 
Purpose of a study contains information about the central phenomenon that is 
explored in a particular study (Creswell, 2009). It defines type of contribution that a 
study aims to make to the existing body of knowledge. Four types of contributions 
of studies are identified as descriptive, explanatory (analytical), predictive, and 
prescriptive (Sekaran, 2003).  
A descriptive study identifies a set of concepts and relationships that describes 
some phenomena of interest. It ascertains and describes the characteristics of 
variables of interest. The primary motivation for an explanatory (analytical) study is 
to test, explain or compare phenomena (Cavana, Delahaye, & Sekaran, 2001) 
whereas that for an exploratory study is to discover and explore new phenomena 
(Myers, 2009). An exploratory study aims at providing a better insight into the 
problem at hand which has been a subject of very few studies. A predictive study 
predicts behaviour of some phenomena that is of interest while a prescriptive study 
aims at describing some actions to be taken to achieve a specific outcome (Cavana 
et al., 2001; Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Sekaran, 2003). 
The objective of this study was to provide a deeper insight on the contribution of 
user participation in ISRM as influenced by national cultures. This objective 
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study. This was found to be consistent with the definition of exploratory studies 
(Cavana et al., 2001; Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Sekaran, 2003).  
3.3.2 Investigation type 
Three types of investigations which researchers can follow when conducting 
research include clarification, correlational and causal (Cavana et al., 2001). In a 
clarification investigation, the researcher attempts to acquire a clear understanding 
of the concepts involved in the research problem. Researchers in correlational 
investigation are interested in establishing the relationships between the concepts 
and variables. Lastly, researchers follow a causal investigation when they aim at 
delineating the cause of one or more problems (Cavana et al., 2001). A correlational 
investigation path was taken in the study. The definitive feature of positivist 
epistemology, as the study was characterised, is that positivists aim at 
investigating fixed relationships using instruments such as questionnaires (Myers, 
2009; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). The correlational investigation path which was 
used in this study was therefore consistent with the prior epistemological 
assumption made in the study. 
3.3.3 Research method 
Reliability, relevance, and quality of research results largely depend on the method 
that a researcher employs to conduct a particular research. A research method is 
defined as “a strategy of inquiry” (Myers, 2009, p. 24). Research methods generally 
fall into two broad classes: quantitative and qualitative (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 
2004). Quantitative research methods use mathematical and statistical tools that 
are used to identify facts and relationships amongst constructs within an area of 
study (Fitzgerald & Howcroft, 1998). Quantitative studies are conducted through 
surveys (questionnaires), experiments or through mathematical modelling (Myers & 
Avison, 2002). Contrary to quantitative methods, qualitative research methods are 
used to study the environment, situations and procedures that cannot be 
interpreted quantitatively (Myers, 2009). Qualitative research methods make it 
possible to have an in depth study of human behaviour through involvement with 
the respondents. Typical examples of qualitative research methods include focus 
group discussions structured and semi-structured interviews. 
There have been on-going debates regarding the appropriate methods for 
conducting research (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2004). The arguments have been to 
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quantitative and qualitative research approaches (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2004). 
Both quantitative and qualitative purists, view their paradigms as ideal for 
conducting research. This, in some way, advocates for the “incompatibility theory” 
(Howe, 1988) which posits that these two paradigms cannot be mixed. Representing 
his qualitative purist position, Guba, (1990, p. 81) contends that “accommodation 
between paradigms is impossible”. On the contrary, the goal of mixed methods, as 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) suggest, is not to replace either of the 
quantitative or qualitative approaches but rather to benefit from the strengths and 
reduce the weaknesses of each of these research paradigms. Mixed methods 
approach enables researchers to have a broader and complimentary view of the 
area being researched (Collins & Hussey, 2003). In addition to this goal, research 
today is becoming “increasingly interdisciplinary, complex, and dynamic” (Johnson 
& Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 15). It is therefore necessary for researchers to 
complement one method with another. This demands researchers to understand 
multiple research methods which would facilitate communication and promote 
collaboration thereby providing research that is of high quality (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
The widespread acceptance of mixed methods research approach has however been 
limited by debates such as the paradigm method and the “best” paradigm issue 
(Migiro & Magangi, 2011). There have been debates as to whether the philosophical 
assumptions and the research methods need to be fitted together or not. For 
instance, paradigm differences can be identified in terms of epistemology (how 
people know what they know), ontology (the nature of reality) and axiology (the 
place of values in research) and methodology (the process of research) (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1988). In response, Reichardt and Rallis (1994) argue that a post-positivist 
philosophical paradigm can be combined only with quantitative methods and that 
an interpretive paradigm can be combined only with qualitative methods. This 
perspective leaves the mixed methods untenable because certain paradigms and 
methods could not “fit” together legitimately. 
The “best paradigm” issue demands the philosophical paradigm which can be 
considered as the best foundation for mixed methods research. The debate 
surrounding the “best paradigm” issue maintains the perspective that mixed 
methods research allows researchers to use any number of philosophical 
foundations for its justification and use. The best paradigm to be employed in a 













P a g e  | 44  
the method” (Migiro & Magangi, 2011, p. 3758). Considering the problem in this 
study, epistemologically stance was considered to be epistemologically appropriate 
as well as a mixed methods approach as the research method.  
Reasons for using mixed methods research go beyond the notion of triangulation 
(testing the consistency of findings obtained through different instruments) (Migiro 
& Magangi, 2011). With mixed methods research, results acquired from using one 
method are used to elaborate on results acquired from using the other method. 
This is referred to as complementation (Migiro & Magangi, 2011). Mixed methods 
research also allows for different methods to be used for different purposes in a 
study. A typical example is use of interviews to get a feel for key issues before 
embarking on a questionnaire survey. Mixed methods research also enables 
triangulation to take place. Migiro and Magangi (2011, p. 3759) define triangulation 
as “the use of different data collection methods within one study in order to ensure 
that the data are telling you what you think they are telling you”. The mixed 
methods approach also helps to explain on quantitative results with the 
subsequent qualitative data. Lastly, qualitative data collected in mixed methods 
research can be used to develop theory that can subsequently be tested using the 
quantitative data (Migiro & Magangi, 2011).  
Aspects that are considered when designing and planning mixed methods research: 
timing, weighting, mixing and theorizing or transforming perspectives (Creswell, 
2009). Mixed methods researchers need to decide on whether the quantitative and 
qualitative data collection will be in phases (sequentially) or gathered at the same 
time (concurrently). In phased data collection plan, either quantitative or 
qualitative data collection can come first. Data in this study was collected 
concurrently. The time when invitations to complete the questionnaire were sent to 
the survey participants, semi-structured interviews were being conducted in 
Malawi. Some of the questions on the questionnaire were also structured to solicit 
qualitative data from the survey participants. This ensured concurrent collection of 
both qualitative and quantitative data. 
Weighting or priority is the second factor that goes into the design procedures for 
mixed methods research (Creswell, 2009). In view of the purpose of the study 
(correlational), which can only be measured or assessed quantitatively, more weight 
was put on the quantitative data than on qualitative data. There was more interest 
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larger population of information security administrators and information systems 
auditors. The qualitative data was mainly used to define user participation roles in 
ISRM. While the survey questionnaire also captured this type of information, a 
clear picture of user participation roles in ISRM was acquired through the semi-
structured interviews.  
In mixed methods research, mixing of the two types of data takes place at different 
levels: the data collection, the data analysis, interpretation or at all three phases 
(Creswell, 2009). Mixing of data in mixed methods research means either the 
qualitative and quantitative data are merged on one end, kept separate, or 
combined in some way (Creswell, 2009). The survey instrument (the questionnaire) 
was used to collect both quantitative and qualitative data (mixing at data 
collection). During data analysis and interpretation, reflective indicators of user 
participation in ISRM (qualitative in nature) were used in the validity and reliability 
analyses and the interpretations thereof (mixing at analysis and interpretation). 
Mixing of the data types in this study was therefore performed at all the three 
stages (data collection, analysis and interpretation). 
The mixed methods research approach was consistent with the epistemological 
positivist assumption which recommends structures such as questionnaires to be 
used to study and establish the “cause and effect” relationships (Myers, 2009; 
Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Questionnaires were used to solicit ideas and 
suggestions from a larger population about the contribution of user participation in 
ISRM, as influenced by culture, on the management of information security. 
Concepts and ideas collected through semi-structured interviews were used to 
confirm those collected quantitatively through the survey questionnaire (Cavana et 
al., 2001).  
3.3.4 Study population 
Participants to the survey included those having a bias towards information 
security such as IS auditors and information security administrators. The 
responsibilities of information security administrators are “to ensure that various 
users within an organisation comply with the corporate security policy and that 
information security controls are adequate to prevent unauthorised access to data, 
programs and equipment” (ISACA, 2008, p. 109). Among many others, the 
functions of information security administrators include maintaining access rules 













P a g e  | 46  
and maintenance of user IDs and passwords; monitoring security violations and 
taking corrective actions, reviewing and evaluating the information security policy 
and suggesting necessary changes to management; preparing and monitoring the 
information security awareness programs for all employees within an organisation; 
and testing the security architecture to evaluate the security strengths and detect 
possible threats (ISACA, 2008). Information security administrators were, therefore, 
an ideal group of professionals which was expected to provide the best assessment 
as to the roles assumed by users as part of information security practices in 
various organisations. 
Secondly, IS auditors are individuals who regularly “review and evaluate automated 
information processing systems, related nonautomated processes and the 
interfaces between them” (ISACA, 2008, p. 27). According to ISACA (2008), IS 
auditors provide an assurance to management that information systems and 
related resources  
“…adequately safeguard assets, maintain data and system integrity and 
availability, provide relevant and reliable information, achieve organisational 
goals effectively, consume resources efficiently and have in effect, internal 
controls that provide reasonable assurance that business, operational and 
control objectives will be met and that undesired events will be prevented, or 
detected and  corrected, in a timely manner”.        
IS auditors were also conside ed suitable to provide an objective account of roles 
and responsibilities that users assume in various organisations as part of 
information security management.  
3.3.5 Sampling 
Quality of a social research can be assessed based on four criteria: authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning (Scott, 1990). Authenticity is concerned 
with the originality of the evidence gathered. Credibility is concerned with the 
evidence being free from errors and distortion. Meaning is concerned with clarity 
and comprehensibility of the evidence and representativeness is concerned with the 
typicality of the evidence (Myers, 2009). Myers (2009) further defines 
representativeness as the extent to which a sample can be taken as representative 
of a population from where the sample was chosen. It is the extent to which 
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those of the larger population. The question of representativeness inherently deals 
with the sampling technique employed in a study.  
3.3.5.1 Quantitative sampling and strategy 
The technique used to identify participants to the survey in both South Africa and 
Malawi is what is referred to as snowball sampling (Coleman, 1958). In snowball 
(also known as chain-referral) sampling, participants recruit their friends 
(Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004) hence snowball 
sampling is also referred to as respondent-driven sampling method. The technique 
starts by identifying a few participants who, upon being interviewed, the 
respondents refer the researcher to their friends as potential participants who 
possess the desired characteristics (Cavana et al., 2001; Goel & Salganik, 2010). 
Snowball method was originally developed to overcome problems of sampling in the 
studies of hidden populations.  
One problem associated with snowball method is that it is not possible to 
determine sample representativeness. It is therefore not possible to 
make generalisations from studies which use snowball sampling method (Goel & 
Salganik, 2010). The other problem associated with snowball sampling method is 
that the method is strongly biased (Faugier & Sargeant, 1997). In snowball 
sampling, individuals having many inter-relationships have high chances of being 
included in the sample and snowball samples lack individual inclusion 
probabilities (Faugier & Sargeant, 1997). This consequently makes it impossible to 
have unbiased estimations, which is the case with probabilistic sampling methods 
such as simple random sampling method.   
While the weaknesses of snowball sampling were appreciated, the method is 
recommended in literature (Faugier & Sargeant, 1997; Snijders, 1992), as the 
appropriate way to reach populations which are difficult to contact (hidden 
population). The method is also suggested as a formal method intended to make 
inferences regarding populations of individuals. Snowball sampling technique is 
highly recommended for studies where no member groups, lists, or identifiable 
clusters exist for the target population (Cavana et al., 2001; Faugier & Sargeant, 
1997; Snijders, 1992). This was the case in Malawi where no forums or local 
chapters for information security professionals or IS auditors existed at the time of 
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provided a sampling frame where participants to the study could have been 
identified.  
While the question of representativeness is highly considered as the greatest 
weakness of snowball sampling method (Cavana et al., 2001; Faugier & Sargeant, 
1997; Hendriks, Blanken, Adriaans, & Hartnoll, 1992), it is also suggested in 
literature that the distribution, size and type of people in the snowball sample 
would account for some level of representativeness (Faugier & Sargeant, 1997). 
These would make some degree of statistical inference possible. These arguments 
show more strengths of the snowball sampling method than its weaknesses. Its use 
in this study was therefore deemed appropriate while at the same time being 
mindful of the weaknesses as discussed above. 
3.3.5.2 Sampling strategy for the qualitative study 
In Malawi, Blantyre Water Board (BWB) was selected through simple random 
sampling or unrestricted method (Sekaran, 2003). Simple random sampling is a 
technique of identifying participants to a study where “every element in the 
population has a known and equal chance of being selected as a subject” (Sekaran, 
2003, p. 270). BWB was randomly selected from a list comprising of six (6) water 
supply companies and four (4) mobile telephone service providers as listed in 
Appendix E. Utility companies were chosen as they are geographically found 
in all the three regions of Malawi. 
Interview participants were subsequently selected purposively from BWB. Purposive 
sampling involves obtaining information from specific members of the target 
population who can specifically provide the information that is desired in a study 
(Sakaran, 2003). An interview is a data gathering technique that involves 
questioning the subjects that are referred to as informants or interviewee (Myers, 
2009). There are different types of interviews: structured, unstructured and semi-
structured.  In structured interviews, the interviewer has a list of predetermined 
questions which are administered by telephoning, personally or through a 
computer. In structured interviews, the information to be collected is known at the 
outset (Sekaran, 2003). In unstructured interviews, the interviewer does not have a 
planned sequence of questions that are to be asked. The main aim of unstructured 
interviews is to bring to the surface issues that need further investigation (Sekaran, 
2003). In semi-structured interviews, the researcher has preformatted questions to 
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relevant questions. This is a combination of unstructured and structured 
interviews (Sekaran, 2003). The semi-structured interview type was adopted in this 
study.  
3.3.6 Survey instruments 
Two study instruments were used to collect data. An interview guide (Appendix A) 
was used to collect data from semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire 
(Appendix B), was used to collect data from the survey participants. A 
questionnaire is “a pre-formulated written set of questions to which respondents 
record their answers” (Cavana et al., 2001, p. 226). Since the instruments were 
adapted from Spears and Barki (2010), pre-testing of the instruments was not 
deemed necessary.  
3.3.7 Measurement of variables 
A variable is defined as “a characteristic or an attribute of an individual or an 
organisation that can be measured or observed” (Creswell, 2009, p. 50). 
Researchers in Psychology prefer to use “construct” rather than “variable” 
(Creswell, 2009). These terms were used interchangeably in this study.  Some 
constructs such as blood pressure, pulse rates, temperature are easy to measure 
through the use of measuring instruments while others such as people’s feelings, 
attitudes, and perceptions become difficult to measure (Sekaran, 2003). One way to 
measure such things is by reducing their abstract notions to observable 
characteristics or behaviours (Cavana et al., 2001; Sekaran, 2003) which are also 
referred to as dimensions. 
Considering the objective of the study, i.e. to understand the effect of user 
participation in ISRM as influenced by OC or ISC, three concepts as presented in 
Figure 3.1, were of interest to be measured in the study. These include user 
participation, ISRM, and culture (OC or ISC). 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual relationships 
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Three dimensions of an ISC include beliefs, actions and behaviour (Lim et al., 
2009). As one of the variables which cannot be measured directly, user 
participation was measured by its observable characteristics. Participants to 
the study were asked to list user participation roles which are within the 
scope of information security management. These were then classified 
according to the five observable characteristics of culture: responsibility, 
participation, commitment, motivation and awareness (Lim et al., 2009). 
b) Information Security Culture (ISC) 
Literature posits that ISC influences user behaviour towards ISRM practices 
(Lim et al., 2009; Lim et al., 2010; Robbins, 1989). It was assumed that for 
users to be motivated and actually participate in information security 
management practices, ISC and OC must first exist in the organisation which 
facilitates the users’ commitment, attitude and behaviour (Robbins, 1989). 
ISC is one example of variables which cannot be measured directly since it 
involves user feelings, attitude, and perceptions (Sekaran, 2003). The 
existence of ISC in the participants’ organisations was therefore measured 
through the five observable user characteristics as depicted in the conceptual 
model (Figure 2.4). These include user responsibility, participation, 
commitment, motivation and awareness (Lim et al., 2009) about the 
management of information security.  
The questionnaire survey instrument contained items which were reflective of 
these five observable characteristics of ISC. For instance, participants were 
asked to list roles which users performed in their respective organisations as 
part of information security management practices. The participants were also 
asked to indicate if users in their respective organisations show a sense of 
responsibility and commitment to maintaining information security. Similarly, 
the questionnaire contained items which captured information about user 
awareness about information security. This information was used to assess 
the existence of ISC in various organisations.  
Based on the expectancy theory, user motivation, which is also referred to as 
“behavioural intention” (Burton, Chen, Grover, & Stewart, 1992) to use a 
particular system or to participate in ISRM was measured or assessed by 
observing the user’s actual participation in ISRM. User motivation or 
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characteristics (Creswell, 2009). Similarly, user commitment to ISRM is 
manifested through the users’ actual participation in information security 
practices. Questionnaire items which were reflective of these observable 
characteristics of ISC were therefore the same as those for user participation 
in ISRM. Reflective items for user awareness about information security were 
measured on a five-point Likert scale. 
1. Strongly agree (users often need to be reminded to follow security policy) 
2. Disagree 
3. Neutral (not certain) 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly agree (users often ask for clarification on the information security 
policy) 
c) Information Security Management 
Participants to the study were also asked to provide a list of roles performed 
by users in their respective organisations as part of information security 
management practices. Typical examples of information security management 
practices include granting of access, segregation of duties and compliance 
with information security policies as outlined in the conceptual model (Figure 
2.4). 
Significant differences in the data collected in South Africa and Malawi about the 
observable characteristics of ISC were expected to be reflective of cultural 
differences between the two countries.  
3.3.8 Data collection 
In South Africa, invitations to participate in the survey were sent to 200 registered 
members of ISACA through ISACA’s South Africa Chapter. Out of the 200, 41 
respondents responded representing a response rate of 20.5%. In Malawi, a total of 
58 invitations were sent out through snowball sampling method and only 31 
responses were received representing a response rate of 59.6%. In total, 72 
responses were received (56.9% for South Africa and 43.1% for Malawi).  
Six members of staff were purposively selected from Malawi BWB for semi-
structured interviews. Of the six, one was Head of IT, one the Head of Internal 
Audit, three zone managers, and one Planning and Development Manager. All the 
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3.3.9 Data analysis 
The data analysis process was preceded by the data cleaning process. Data was 
exported into Microsoft Excel 2010 where it was checked for incompleteness and 
inconsistences. For instance, some respondents had entered “2 yrs” to indicate 
number of years that they had been working on their position instead of just “2” as 
was expected. Omissions were also checked and where necessary, the data was 
edited. Subsequently, data was exported to IBM SPSS Statistics 20 where it was 
analysed. 
3.3.9.1 Data description 
Data was summarised and described using descriptive statistics. These include 
measures of central tendency and dispersion. Item means and variances were used 
to establish whether the questions were properly worded (Sekaran, 2003). A mean 
is “a measure of central tendency that offers a general picture of the data” 
(Sekaran, 2003, p. 396). The mean takes away the need to examine each of the 
observations in a data set.  
Measures of central tendency do not provide enough information about the data as 
two data sets may have the same mean but with different dispersions (Sekaran, 
2003). It is therefore important to know the variability that exists in a set of 
observations. Three measures of variability are range, variance and standard 
deviation. Only the standard deviation was used in this study as it is the most 
commonly used among the three (Sekaran, 2003). Measures of dispersion and 
central tendency help to establish whether respondents similarly respond to the 
questionnaire items. The measures also help to detect gaps and outliers (Hussey & 
Hussey, 1997). Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 200) define an outlier as “an extreme 
value or item of data which does not seem to conform to the general pattern”.  
The frequency distributions for the demographic variables were obtained and visual 
displays of histograms and bar charts were produced. This helped in establishing 
how data for each demographic variable was distributed. Knowledge about the 
distribution of the data is required by some statistical tests such as the parametric 
tests which require some proof of the data having a normal distribution. One such 
assumption is, for example, the data to be normally distributed (Cavana et al., 
2001; Field, 2005; Sekaran, 2003). Questionnaire item means were checked for 
significant difference between the data collected in South Africa and that from 
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examining significant differences between independent sets of data (Sekaran, 
2003). Non-parametric tests do not assume the data to be normally distributed. 
3.3.9.2 Construct validity analysis 
Construct validity analysis was used to establish whether the questionnaire tapped 
the concepts of user participation in ISRM just as they were theorized in this study. 
A statistical technique referred to as Factor Analysis is often used to identify the 
underlying structure of data sets (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2002). Factor analysis is “a 
statistical technique used for reducing a large number of variables to a meaningful, 
interpretable and manageable set of factors” (Cavana et al., 2001, p. 456). The 
principal factor analysis was used in this study. This accounts for total variance 
and is used to reduce a complex set into simpler subsets. The second type of factor 
analysis is known as exploratory factor analysis. This accounts for common 
variance and is appropriate for discovering unknown structures. A part from 
checking for goodness of the data, factor analysis is also used to examine the 
validity of constructs. The factor analysis technique was used in the current study 
to assess whether the constructs precisely measured the concepts which they were 
intended to measure.  
3.3.9.3 Internal consistency of measures 
This measure was performed to establish whether the items under each extracted 
factor hanged together as a set. This was also aimed at establishing whether the 
items were capable of independently measuring the same concept. This was to 
enable deductions that respondents attached the same overall meaning to each of 
the items under each extracted factor. According to Sekaran (2003), internal 
consistency of measures is assessed by checking if the items are highly correlated. 
3.3.9.4 Instrument reliability analysis 
Reliability is alternatively defined as “a way of ensuring that a scale consistently 
reflects the construct it is measuring” (Field, 2005, p. 666), the extent to which 
measurements of a variable are repeatable and that any random influence which 
makes the measurements to be different from occasion to occasion is a source of 
measurement error (Nunnally, 1967), or as “the extent to which a measure is 
without bias (error-free) and hence ensures consistent measurement across time 
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these definitions is for a measurement to be error-free over time and in different 
measuring conditions. 
One type of reliability measure is internal consistency measures (Sekaran, 2003). is 
referred to as inter-item consistency reliability. The most commonly used inter-item 
consistency reliability test is the Cronbach’s alpha (Cavana et al., 2001; Creswell, 
2009; Sekaran, 2003). Though popularly referred to as “the” estimate of reliability, 
Cronbach’s alpha is not the only way to estimate reliability (Cortina, 1993). The 
choice of the method used to estimate reliability depends on the sources of variance 
that are considered relevant in the study. If of interest are errors associated with 
time, then the test-retest approach may be used to estimate reliability. If error 
factors associated with the use of different items are of interest, then internal 
consistency tests such as Cronbach’s alpha becomes appropriate (Cortina, 1993). 
Error factors associated with the use of different items were of interest in this study 
hence internal consistency test using Cronbach’s alpha was performed to estimate 
reliability. 
Cronbach’s alpha takes into account variances attributed to subjects and the 
interactions amongst the subjects and items (Cortina, 1993). It indicates how well 
the items in a set are positively correlated to one another (Cavana et al., 2001; 
Field, 2005). While many books, journals or people consider .7 and above as 
acceptable values for Cronbach’s alpha to indicate reliable scale, empirical evidence 
shows that a large alpha value does not necessarily imply reliability in the scale 
(Cortina, 1993; Field, 2005). This is due to the fact that Cronbach’s alpha is 
dependent on the number of items (N) that are in the scale. Cronbach’s alpha is 
computed using the following equation: 
   
     
∑     
  ∑       
  
Where Cov  = Covariance 
    = Variance 
 N = Number of items in the scale 
As the number of items on the scale increases, the value for Cronbach’s  also 
efore be obtained if one increased the number 
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3.3.9.5 Hypotheses testing 
Two hypotheses were tested in this study. The first hypothesis (H1), proposed that 
user participation in ISRM contributes to the efficient management of information 
security. In line with the type of investigation that was employed in this study, 
correlational associations were used to establish the relationships between various 
constructs. 
The second hypothesis (H2) proposed that the participation of users in ISRM 
practices in South Africa and Malawi is the same. This was tested using the 
parametric t-test. A t-test is designed for testing the difference between two-sample 
means. There are two types of t-tests: independent and dependent t-tests. An 
independent t-test is performed when there are two experimental conditions with 
two different participants while a dependent (also known as paired or matched-
pairs) is performed when there are two experimental conditions but with the same 
participants (Field, 2005). Since this study had its participants drawn from South 
Africa and Malawi, independent t-test was used to test the difference between the 
two-sample means. 
The assumptions under the independent t-test include data normality, data 
measured at an interval scale, variances in the groups being equal (variance 
homogeneity), and the scores being independent (Field, 2005). The variance 
homogeneity assumption was tested using Levene’s test while the normality 
assumption was assumed based on the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) which posits 
that given a distribution with a mean μ and variance σ², the sampling distribution 
of the mean approaches a normal distribution with a mean (μ) and a variance σ²/N 
as N (the sample size) increases (Lumley, Diehr, Emerson & Chen, 2002). This 
study had 72 responses where 45 were complete and usable responses. This was 
considered to be reasonably large to warrant the normality assumption.  
3.4 Research time frame 
There are two approaches with respect to research time frame: longitudinal and 
cross-sectional. A longitudinal research is conducted over a long period of time 
while a cross-sectional research is conducted over a short period of time (Gray, 
2009). This study was conducted from February to August 2012 hence 
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3.5 Ethical considerations 
Sekaran (2003, p. 17) defines ethics in business research as “a code of conduct or 
expected societal norm of behaviour”. Not only does ethical conduct apply to the 
researchers but also to the members who sponsor the research. According to 
Sekaran (2003), the observance of ethics in research needs to begin with the person 
instituting the research. It is also expected of the researchers to demonstrate a 
good ethical behaviour throughout the period of conducting the research.  
This study ensured research ethics were observed throughout the time when the 
research was conducted. In line with Sekaran (2003), respondents to the survey as 
well as participants for the semi-structured interviews were not asked to identify 
themselves by names. In addition, information provided by the respondents was 
treated as confidential as possible. The purpose of the study was also clearly 
outlined to the participants through the letter of introduction herein attached in 
Appendix C and verbally communicated to the participants before conducting an 
interview. It was also ensured that no intrusive information was solicited from the 
participants. Also, it was clearly indicated that participation in the survey was 
mandatory. The interview participants were made aware of use of monitoring 
devices such as voice recorders before commencement of each interview. Lastly, 
before instituting the research, an ethics clearance was sought from the University 
of Cape Town Research Ethics committee for approval. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
There are four sections presented in this chapter. Firstly, the chapter presents the 
research philosophy. This reflects the way how the researcher believes knowledge is 
developed or acquired. Research philosophies determine the way in which a 
particular study is conducted. Secondly, the chapter presents the research 
methodology. This discusses various areas pertaining to the execution of the 
research which include a discussion of the purpose of the study, type of 
investigation, the research method, survey participants, sampling, data collection 
and analysis. The chapter also presents the research time frame as well ethical 
considerations which guided the conduct of the researcher throughout the period 
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Chapter 4 : Data analysis and research findings 
This chapter presents the data analysis results as well as the discussions for the 
results. The study collected both quantitative and qualitative data through survey 
questionnaire and interviews respectively. The chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 4.1 outlines the demographic characteristics of the participants, data 
analysis and its interpretations. Quantitative data analysis and discussions for the 
results are presented in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, results for both internal validity 
and reliability are discussed. Hypothetical test results are laid down in Section 4.4. 
 
4.1 Demographic characteristics of participants 
4.1.1 Educational qualifications 
There were 72 participants in the quantitative study (56.9% from South Africa and 
43.1% from Malawi). The response rate was 20.5% in South Africa and 53.4% in 
Malawi. In total, there were 24 graduates (12 from each country) representing 
33.3% of the participants and 26 post graduates (9 for Malawi and 17 for South 
Africa) representing 36.1% of the respondents. There were also 17 participants (8 
for Malawi and 9 for South Africa) representing 23.6% of the total participants who 
had attended some college but had no degrees and the rest had associate degrees. 
See Figure 4.1. With this education background, the participants were expected to 
provide a good assessment of user participation in ISRM practices. 
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As it can be noted from Figure 4.1, there seemed to be slight differences on 
participants’ education backgrounds between participants from South Africa and 
those from Malawi. While participants in South Africa mainly comprised of those 
holding Bachelor’s degrees and post-graduate degrees, the majority of participants 
from Malawi were graduates from high schools and holders of post-graduate 
degrees. Despite these minor differences in educational qualifications, the 
participants from the two countries were highly educated. They were therefore 
expected to provide a sound assessment of user participation in ISRM practices 
which, in turn, contributes to the management of information security.  
4.1.2 Professional qualifications 
Figure 4.2 shows that about 90% of the respondents had professional certifications 
that were specific to information security management and information security 
auditing. 
 
Figure 4.2: Respondents by professional qualifications 
The respondents demonstrated a good command of knowledge about user 
participation roles in ISRM. Respondents listed user participation roles which are 
consistent with the ISRM practices according to Spears and Barki (2010) and 
Stoneburner et al (2002). All the participants were working as information security 
administrators, information security compliance officers, or information systems 
auditors. Therefore, quality and objectivity in the information provided was 
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expected. This had a bearing on the value and reliability of the findings from this 
study.    
4.1.3 Industry types 
For an organisation to have a risk appetite (amount of risk an organisation is 
willing to accept in pursuit of stakeholder value), it first needs to understand its 
risk profile. The number of respondents per industry types was assumed to be a 
reflection of the information security risk appetites for the industries. For instance, 
financial institutions (finance, banking, and insurance) had the highest number of 
respondents in Malawi while in South Africa the government and military seconded 
by financial institutions had the highest numbers of these professionals as can be 
noted from Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3: Respondents by industry types 
The industries having the highest numbers of information security professionals 
can be concluded to be more interested in managing information security. As 
reflected in Figure 4.3, 70% of the respondents in South Africa came from 
government and military (29%), financial institutions (26%), and consulting firms 
(15%). These industries were, therefore, identified as having the good appetite for 
information security management. On the contrary, 80% of the respondents in 
came from financial institutions hence the only industry identified as having a good 
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4.2 Quantitative methods 
The quantitative methods were used to examine statistical relationships between 
constructs. There are three main objectives behind quantitative data analysis: 
describing the data (getting the feel of the data), testing for the goodness of the 
data, and testing hypotheses developed for the research (Sekaran, 2003).  The feel 
for the data provides researchers with the preliminary ideas of how good the scales 
used in the study were and how well the coding and entering of data has been.  
Testing the goodness of data involves testing for both reliability and validity of 
measures used in the research study. Reliability of a measure is established by 
testing for its consistency and stability. According to Sekarani (2003, p. 307), 
“consistency indicates how well the items measuring a concept hang together as a 
set”. The Cronbach’s alpha was used as a reliability coefficient which “indicates 
how well the items in a set are positively correlated to one another” (Sekaran, 2003, 
p. 307). If the computed Cronbach’s alpha is closer to 1, the internal consistency 
(or the measuring scale) is said to be highly reliable. Hypothesis testing is achieved 
by using relevant statistical tests according to the type of data. Hypotheses testing 
aim at substantiating the predictions made in the study. 
Contrary to the data analysis approaches in quantitative studies which often begin 
with a description of the data (Cavana et al., 2001; Sekaran, 2003), and then 
flowing through to validity and reliability tests, quantitative data analysis followed 
the plan presented in Figure 4.4. The survey instruments were adapted from 
Spears and Barki (2010). While instrument pre-testing was deemed not necessary, 
their validity and reliability were required to be checked before the actual data 
analysis and hypothesis testing were conducted. The subsequent data analyses 
were conducted based on the extracted constructs and not those reflected on the 
questionnaire survey instrument.   
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4.2.1 Validity analysis 
4.2.1.1 Construct validity 
As already discussed in Section 3.3.9.2, construct validity analysis was used to 
establish whether the survey instrument tapped the concepts of user participation 
in ISRM as theorized. Table 4.1 shows linear components (or factors), which were 
extracted at Eigenvalues greater than 1. Eigenvalues indicate substantive 
importance of each factor. Eigenvalues represent the amount of variation explained 
by a factor. This variation is also expressed as a percentage of variance. According 
to Field (2005), Eigenvalues greater than 1 represent substantial amount of 
variation in the extracted factors. As it can be noted from Table 4.4, nine factors 
were responsible for 76.8% of the total variance. Extraction of factors was done at 
factor loadings greater than 0.5. Factor loadings are correlation coefficients which 
indicate the relative contribution of each individual variable (or item) on the factor. 
A substantive importance of a variable to a factor is obtained by squaring the factor 
loading (Field, 2005).   
Factors 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.257 24.191 24.19 
2 3.217 10.724 34.92 
3 2.567 8.558 43.47 
4 2.205 7.351 50.82 
5 1.847 6.155 56.98 
6 1.786 5.954 62.93 
7 1.609 5.364 68.30 
8 1.335 4.450 72.75 
9 1.217 4.056 76.80 
Table 4.1: Factor analysis - Component extraction 
The factor analysis results presented in Appendix D show that there were leakages 
on items q1.5 and q2.4. Item leakage implies that respondents were confused about 
the items (Cavana et al., 2001). These items needed to be removed from the 
questionnaire or replaced with more understandable ones. The items were therefore 
excluded from subsequent statistical analyses. While literature recommends factor 
loadings greater that 0.3 (Cavana et al., 2001), factors were extracted at loadings 
greater than 0.5 in order to reduce number of item leakages. 
4.2.1.2 Internal consistency 
As already discussed in Section 3.3.9.3, items under each extracted factor were 
assessed for consistency by checking if the items were highly correlated (Sekaran, 
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Factor 1: Items q1.1, q1.3, q1.4 and q1.7 loaded on Factor 1. A close examination 
of these items showed that the items related to user participation in ISRM 
according to Spears and Barki (2010). The loading of these items on Factor 1 
was an indication of the items’ reasonable measurement of the latent variable 
“User Participation in ISRM”. This factor was accordingly named as such and 
was represented as UPISRM. The high correlations in Table 4.2 show that (1) 
the items hanged together as a set, (2) the items independently measured the 
same concept and (3) the respondents attached the same overall meaning to 
each of the items in each extracted factor. 
 
Table 4.2: Internal consistency for UPISRM 
Table 4.3 outlines questionnaire items which were identified to be reflective of 
UPISRM. These items were cross-checked against those that Stoneburner et al. 
(2002) as well as Spears and Barki (2010) suggest are in the scope of user 
participation in ISRM.  
 
Table 4.3: Comparison of UPISRM roles 
As it can be noted from Table 4.3, the items underlying UPISRM were found to 
be consistent with those that Spears and Barki (2010) and Stoneburner et al 
(2002) suggested are in the domain of ISRM.  
Factor 2: Questionnaire items q3.4, q7.1, q7.2, q7.3, and q8 loaded on Factor 2. 
Referring to the survey instrument presented in Appendix B, these items were 
reflective of improvement in information security control performance 
(Stoneburner et al., 2002; Spears & Barki, 2010). Factor 2 was, therefore, 
labelled “improvement in information security control performance” and 













P a g e  | 63  
and results as outlined in Table 4.4 show that the items hanged together as a 
set, they independently measured the IMISCP and that the respondents 
attached the same overall meaning to each of the items. Factors which reflect 
IMISCP include reduction in the number or significance of control errors and 
increase in efficiency across the system of controls in the protection of 
information from related risks (Spears & Barki, 2010). 
 
Table 4.4: Internal consistency for IMISCP 
Factor 3: Questionnaire items which had loadings on Factor 3 were q2.1, q2.2, 
q2.3, and q2.6. Item q2.4 was removed due to its leakage to Factor 8. An 
examination of these items showed that the items were related to user 
participation roles in the daily information security control. Factor 3 was 
therefore named “user participation in information security control” and 
represented as UPISC. The items underlying Factor 3 were also assessed for 
internal consistency. The high correlations as can be noted in Table 4.5 
showed that the items were internally consistent.  
 
Table 4.5: Internal consistency for UPISC 
The second area of user participation in ISRM practices, according to Spears 
and Barki (2010) is information security control. Items which loaded on 
Factor 3 were also established to be consistent with those that Spears and 
Barki (2010) suggest are in the scope of UPISC. These have been outlined in 
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Table 4.6: Comparison of UPISC roles 
Factor 4: Items with loadings on factor 4 were q1.2, q1.6, q3.1, and q3.3. These 
items relate to users being held accountable and responsible for ISRM 
practices. Factor 4 was therefore labelled “User accountability and 
responsibility” and was represented as USACC/RESP. High correlations as 
outlined in Table 4.7 show that the items were internally consistent hence 
hanged together as a set, independently measured user accountability, and 
responsibility and the respondents attached the same overall meaning to each 
of the items (Sekaran, 2003). 
 
Table 4.7: Internal consistency for USACC/RESP 
Factor 5: Questionnaire items which loaded on Factor 5 were q3.6, q6.1, q6.2, 
and q6.3. These items relate to information security control development and 
remediation. Factor 5 was therefore named as “user participation in control 
development” and was assigned the code UPCD. The high correlations as can 
be noted in Table 4.8 signify internal consistencies among the items.  
 
Table 4.8: Internal consistency for UPCD 
There were two items which loaded on Factor 6 and these were q4 and q5. 
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(q3.2). Also item q9 loaded on Factor 9. Factor loadings with items less than three 
are considered to be unstable (Costello & Osborne, 2005). However, unstable 
factors can still be maintained if they are suitably defined by the underlying items 
(Hatcher, 1994).  
Items q4 and q5 which loaded on Factor 6 relate to user awareness and sense of 
ownership for information security practices. This factor was accordingly named 
“user demonstrated sense of ownership and awareness” and given a variable code 
UDSOA. Items q2.5 and q3.5, which loaded on Factor 7 relates to user participation 
in information security awareness campaigns. This factor was therefore named as 
such and given the variable name UPISAC. Factor 8 resulted in having item q3.2 
which relates to users taking up responsibilities for information security practices. 
This relates to Factor 4. Similarly, Factor 9 which only had one item loaded 
relates to Factor 2. Based on Hatcher (2003), factors 6 and 7 were maintained.  
4.2.2 Reliability analysis 
As discussed in Section 3.3.9.4, reliability of the extracted factors was assessed 
using Cronbach’s alpha.  Table 4.9 presents a summary of the reliability analysis 
, values of .7 and even 
below .7 can be realistic when dealing with psychological constructs (Cavana et al., 
2001; Kline, 2000; Sekaran, 2003). This study dealt with constructs which were 
precisely psychological. Also as discussed in Section 3.3.9.4
includes number of items squared. It is therefore 
by simply increasing the number of items (Field, 2005).  
 
Table 4.9: Constructs reliability analysis 
Results in Table 4.9 show that the numbers of items on the extracted factors were 
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4.2.3 Descriptive statistics 
As discussed in Section 3.3.9.1, the mean and standard deviation were used to 
assess the centrality and dispersion (spread) of the data. Measures of central 
tendency and dispersion were obtained for all the items underlying each factor 
(linear component). The measures were done simultaneously for South Africa and 
Malawi to establish whether respondents in the two countries understood and 
reacted to the questionnaire items in the same manner (Sekaran, 2003). 
a) Central tendency and dispersion of UPISRM 
Table 4.10 shows means and standard deviations for items underlying UPISRM. 
The items were measured on a scale on 1 to 3. As it can be noted, the item 
means were clustered around 1 reflecting that respondents from the two 
countries responded “Yes” to users participating in the ISRM roles. 
 
Table 4.10: Central tendency and dispersion of UPISRM 
The results in Table 4.10 also show that there is no significant difference 
between the responses from participants in South Africa and those in Malawi. 
It may therefore be concluded that users in both countries participate in ISRM 
practices as those listed in Table 4.10 in the same way. 
b) Central tendency and dispersion of IMISCP 
Items underlying IMISCP were also assessed for their central tendency and 
dispersion using item means and standard deviation. Results of this 
assessment are presented in Table 4.11. All the items were measured on a 
scale of 1 to 5 representing “much worse”, “worse”, “no change”, “better”, and 
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Table 4.11: Central tendency and dispersion of IMISCP 
The results show a slight improvement in items q7.1, q7.2, and q7.3 as the 
item means are generally clustered around 4 which represented “better” on 
the Likert scale. There was, however, no improvement in item q8 as evidenced 
by the means clustered around 3 (no change). This was true for both South 
Africa and Malawi. 
c) Central tendency and dispersion of UPISC 
Measures of central tendency and dispersion for items underlying UPISC, as 
presented in Table 4.12, show that users in South Africa and Malawi similarly 
participate in information security controls. This is with an exception of item 
q2.6 whose the mean for South Africa is 1.57 which is close to 2 i.e. “No” on 
the Likert scale. This seems to be significantly different from the mean of the 
same item 1.48 for Malawi.    
 
Table 4.12: Central tendency and dispersion of UPISC 
d) Central tendency and dispersion of USACC/RESP 
Items underlying USACC/RESP were also assessed for central tendency and 
dispersion. The items were measured on a scale of 1 to 3 and results in Table 
4.13 show that users in South Africa and Malawi are similarly accountable 
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Table 4.13: Locality and dispersion of USACC/RESP 
e) Central tendency and dispersion of UPCD 
Table 4.14 presents means and standard deviations for items underlying 
UPCD. The items were assessed on a scale of 1 to 3 and the results show that 
organisational management in South Africa and Malawi similarly support the 
development of information security controls. However, then means for item 
q6.1 show a significant difference in the way users participate in control 
development between South Africa and Malawi. Contrary to the users in 
South Africa, users in Malawi were reported to participate less in control 
development by providing information required by control developers as 
evidenced by the mean 1.57 which is close to 2 (No) on the Likert scale.  
As it can also be noted from Table 4.14, respondents in the South Africa and 
Malawi were similarly reported not to participate in the assessment of 
information security controls to identify those controls which need 
remediation. This is signified by means 1.52 and 1.62 which are both close to 
2 (no) for Malawi and South Africa respectively. 
 
Table 4.14: Central tendency and dispersion of UPCD 
f) Central tendency and dispersion of UDSOA 
The central tendency and dispersion for items underlying UDSOA were 
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were close to 3 implied respondents’ neutrality on the users’ awareness of 
information security policies as well as users’ sense of ownership for 
protecting information integrity.  
Items underlying UDSOA 






Q4. Users' increased awareness of policies, 
procedures and the need for information security 
2.91 1.20 3.14 1.06 
Q5. users demonstrated sense of ownership 
toward protecting the information integrity 
3.35 1.07 3.00 1.10 
Table 4.15: Central tendency and dispersion of UDSOA 
g) Locality and dispersion of UPISAC 
Items underlying UPISAC were measured on a scale of 1 to 3. The means and 
standard deviations for the two items underlying UPISAC are presented in Table 
4.16.  
Items underlying UDISAC 






Q2.5. Participating in information security 
awareness campaigns 
1.57 0.590 1.24 0.436 
Q3.5. Information security policy communicated 
to users and stakeholders 
1.22 0.518 1.14 0.359 
Table 4.16: Central tendency and dispersion for UPISAC 
The mean for item q2.5 was close to 2 for responses obtained in Malawi 
indicating that users in Malawi do not participate in information security 
awareness campaigns to the same degree as users in South Africa. The mean 
for item q2.5 in South Africa was close to 1 reflecting user participation in 
information security awareness campaigns. Means for item q3.5 were both 
close to 1 implying that information security policies are communicated to all 
the users and stake holders in the two countries.  
4.3 Qualitative methods 
The qualitative methods were used to confirm themes and concepts about user 
participation in ISRM generated from the quantitative data.  
4.3.1 User participation roles 
Survey participants were asked to provide a list of activities which users in their 
organisations performed in the past one year, from the time of data collection, as 
part of ISRM activities. The aim was to solicit ideas and assess the level of 
knowledge of the survey participants on ISRM activities. Participants were also 
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These themes were compared with those which were generated through content 
analysis of the qualitative data. Each theme was checked as to how many times it 
appeared. This generated a frequency table of themes out of which a chart 
presented in Figure 4.4 was constructed. These user participation roles in ISRM 
were established to be consistent with those suggested in literature (Stoneburner et 
al., 2002; Spears & Barki, 2010).  
Results in Figure 4.5 show that development, implementation and remediation of 
information security controls were listed by 31.7% of the respondents in South 
Africa as ISRM roles that user performed in the past one year from the time of 
conducting this research. This was followed by IT risk identification and mitigation 
(14.6%), testing of new processes, procedures and information security controls 
(12.2%), and information security awareness campaigns (12.2%). On the contrary, 
32.3% of the survey participants in Malawi listed user participation in information 
security awareness campaigns followed by physical access control to information 
resources (12.9%) and testing of new process, procedures and information security 
controls (9.7%). 
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Data collected from the semi-structured interviews also confirmed the user 
participation roles outlined in Figure 4.5. Further to confirming these results, one 
interview respondent indicated that granting of access to the billing system at BWB 
depended on the users. “User system access details come from the users who 
exactly know who access what based on the users’ lines of duty”. According to the 
respondent, this information is passed on to the IT department which eventually 
grants access rights to a particular user based on the system access requirements 
received from the user’s department.  
It was also established in a separate interview at BWB that Zone Managers are 
important when it comes to granting access to the water billing system. “…when I 
receive a new member of staff, I am only given the title of the individual by the 
human resources department. Based on what I already know about that role, I 
complete a systems access request form which I send to the IT Department for them 
to create and grant system access to the new member of staff based on details on the 
form”, reported one Zone Manager. It was also learnt that sometimes the IT 
Department implements information security controls without prior communication 
to the user departments.  
“… the problem we usually experience is that our IT Department often makes 
changes or implements new controls without informing us or without firstly soliciting 
our views. Just two days ago, the IT Department installed some software on all the 
computers which has blocked use of flash disks. The problem with that is that our 
network is often times down due to the frequent power black-outs that we are 
currently experiencing in this country. Right now, I am stranded; I can’t print 
anything simply because we only have one network printer at this zone. I have the 
report on my computer but I can no longer use my flash disk to get it printed at 
another zone office”, also noted one Zone Manager. 
This concern of lack of prior communication was also shared by another Zone 
Manager and the Planning and Development Manager. In addition, it was also 
established that no systems audits were conducted at BWB up until the time of 
conducting this study.  
“… BWB only depends on external audits when it comes to systems audits which I 
think is a big problem because those audits are only scheduled once a year. I know 
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necessary that we also perform systems audits and not to wait until the scheduled 
external audits” reported one interview participant. 
4.3.2 Information security awareness  
While user participation in information security awareness campaigns was the 
second highly listed user participation role in South Africa, this was not one of the 
user participation roles in ISRM that participants in Malawi listed. Instead, the 
second highly listed user participation role in Malawi was general IT security 
controls, which includes segregation of duties, use of strong passwords, not 
sharing passwords and many more. This signifies the difference in the way users in 
South Africa and Malawi participate in ISRM practices. User awareness about 
information security is endorsed in literature (David, 2002; Doherty & Fulford, 
2005; Siponen, 2000a) as an important element of ISRM. Despite user participation 
in information security awareness campaigns not being listed by the survey 
participants in Malawi, it came up in one of the interviews at BWB. The interview 
respondent noted that:  
“…users play a very important role in disseminating information about changes in the 
information security policy amongst fellow users. We have not usually conducted 
organisation-wide awareness campaigns when we effect some changes or implement 
new controls. Instead, we always make sure that a few users get to know the 
changes then the information is passed on to their fellow users and eventually the 
whole BWB become aware of the changes.” 
4.3.3 Physical access control and business continuity planning 
Survey participants in Malawi also listed physical access control to information 
resources as well as business continuity and disaster recovery planning as 
activities that users participated in the past one year from the time this study was 
conducted. However, survey participants in South Africa did not list these roles as 
having been performed by users in the past one year from the time this study was 
conducted. This further outlines the difference between Malawi and South Africa on 
how users participate in ISRM.  
4.4 Testing of hypothesis 
Researchers in scientific research are usually interested in finding relationships 
between variables or constructs (Field, 2005). A hypothesis is a prediction that 
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Hypothesis testing aims at explaining the nature of relationships among groups of 
factors (Cavana et al., 2001; Sekaran, 2003).  
As already outlined in Section 3.3.2, the type of investigation adopted in this study 
was correlational. In a correlational investigation, predictions (hypotheses) are 
checked whether they hold or not by observing the associations amongst the items 
underlying the variables of interest (Cavana et al., 2001). For instance, to check 
whether user participation contributes to information security management, 
associations through correlation coefficients of items underlying user participation 
and those items underlying information security management were checked for 
significance. 
H1. User participation in ISRM contributes to effective information security 
management 
To test the above hypothesis, associations of items underlying user participation 
and those reflective of improvement in information security control performance 
IMISCP were checked. Literature proposes three areas in users participate as part of 
information security management. The areas include user participation in the 
ISRM processes, user participation in Information Security Control (ISC), and user 
participation through accountability roles (ACC) (Spears & Barki, 2010).  
a) Association between user participation in ISRM and improvement in 
ISCP 
The items which were used to measure user participation in ISRM included 
item q1.1, q1.3, q1.4, and q1.7 while items which measured user participation 
in ISC included item q3.4, q7.1, q7.2, q7.3 and q8. As it can be noted from 
Table 4.17, items which measured user participation in ISRM were reasonably 
correlated.  
 Items underlying improvement in ISCP 
 Items underlying user participation in ISRM Q3.4 Q7.1 Q7.2 Q7.3 Q8 
Q1.1. Documenting business processes or 
transactions for risk evaluation 
.427** -.127 -.243 -.316* -.130 
Q1.3. Defining procedural controls for example 
rules for access control 
.038 .015 -.063 -.203 .003 
Q1.4. Implementing controls .196 -.053 -.104 -.368* .024 
Q1.7. Communicating Information Security 
regulatory initiatives 
.174 .059 -.083 -.271 .092 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Also worth noting are the significant associations between the paired items 
q1.1:q3.4, q1.1 and q7.3, and q1.4:q7.3. With the correlational investigation 
type which was employed in this study, the results in Table 4.17 substantiate 
the conclusion that user participation in ISRM contributes to improvement in 
ISCP. These results were consistent with literature (Chang & Ho, 2006; 
Siponen, 2005; Spears & Barki, 2010; Stanton & Stam, 2006; Whitman, 
2008), which posit that user participation in ISRM contributes to 
improvement in control performance. 
b) Association between user participation in ISC and improvement in ISCP 
Correlational associations between items which measured user participation 
in ISC and those which measured improvement in ISCP were also assessed. 
Results as presented in Table 4.18 show that these two constructs were 
reasonably correlated. Also worth noting are the significant associations 
between q2.3 and q7.2 as well as items 2.6 and q7.3. 
 
Items underlying improvement in ISCP 
Items underlying user participation in ISC Q3.4 Q7.1 Q7.2 Q7.3 Q8 
Q2.1. Granting access to information 
resources 
.236 -.147 -.127 -.265 .035 
Q2.2. Separation (segregation) of duties -.095 .124 -.021 -.122 .048 
Q2.3. Definition of alerts, triggers, or 
application controls 
.098 -.135 -.368* -.220 -.009 
Q2.6. Determining risk tolerance (risk 
acceptance level) 
.279 -.185 -.264 -.397** .036 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.18: Correlation of user participation in ISC and improvement in ISCP 
The results in Table 4.18 also were in support of the literature which posits 
that user participation in ISRM practices contributes to the efficient 
management of information security (Chang & Ho, 2006; Siponen, 2005; 
Spears & Barki, 2010; Stanton & Stam, 2006; Whitman, 2008). 
c) Association between user participation in ACC/RESP and improvement 
in ISCP 
The results in Table 4.19 are also consistent with literature (Chang & Ho, 
2006; Siponen, 2005; Spears & Barki, 2010; Stanton & Stam, 2006; 
Whitman, 2008) which posits that user participation in ISRM practices 


















Items underlying improvement in ISCP 
Items underlying user participation in ACC/RESP Q3.4 Q7.1 Q7.2 Q7.3 Q8 
Q1.2. Ensuring key controls exist to mitigate specific 
types of risks 
.213 -.278 -.275 -.284 .035 
Q1.6. Remediating defective controls .089 -.123 -.215 -.366* -.125 
Q3.1. Individual roles and responsibilities defined and 
documented 
.349* -.274 -.193 -.291 -.047 
Q3.3. Users (data or process owners) made 
responsible for specific controls 
.317* -.305* -.359* -.433** -.162 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.19: User participation in ACC/RESP and improvement in ISCP 
All the results in Table 4.18, Table 4.19 and Table 4.20 show that user 
participation in ISRM practices contributes to the efficient management of 
information security. This resulted in hypothesis “H1” that user participation in 
ISRM contributes to the efficient management of information security being 
accepted.  
The second objective of this study was to understand how different national 
cultures influence user participation in ISRM which may impact the management 
of information security. These results support the body of literature which posits 
that user participation contributes to the efficient management of information 
security (Chang & Ho, 2006; Siponen, 2005; Spears & Barki, 2010; Stanton & 
Stam, 2006; Whitman, 2008).  
H2. User participation in ISRM practices is the same in South Africa and 
Malawi  
To test for the validity of this hypothesis, means for items underlying the various 
constructs were assessed for significant differences through the parametric t-test 
as discussed in Section 3.3.9.5.  
a) Difference between means for user participation in ACC/RSEP 
As it can be noted from Table 4.20, there were non-significant p-values for all 
the items except item Q1.6 (Remediating defective controls). Firstly, the equal 
variance assumption was violated for this item. Levene’s test for variance 
homogeneity shows a significant p-value of .001. The second row of results 
(Equal variances not assumed) shows a 2-tailed significant p-value of .044. 
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the means of this item for the two countries was significant. An examination 
of the means for item q1.6 showed that users in Malawi do not participate to 
the same degree as their counterparts in South Africa. With mean = 1.50 and 
Std. Error = 1.20 for Malawi and mean = 1.19 and Std. Error = 0.088 for 
South Africa, the difference between the means was significant at  (  )  
           .  
 
Table 4.20: Differences between means for user participation in ACC/RESP 
b) Difference between means for user participation in ISAC 
Means for items (q2.5 and q3.5) underlying user participation in ISAC were 
also tested for significant differences between the data collected in South 
Africa and that from Malawi. Results in Table 4.21 show that the variance 
homogeneity assumption was invalidated by the non-significant F-value of 
1.152 at a p-value of .289 for item q3.5. The corresponding  (  )        was 
also found to be non-significant at      . The Levene’s test for equal 
variances for item q2.5 (Participating in information security awareness 
campaigns) validated the variance homogeneity assumption. As it can be 
noted from Table 4.21, the t-test results for item q2.5 under the “equal 
variance not assumed” row showed a significant difference between the item 
means with  (  )              . An examination of the means for item q2.5 
showed that users in South Africa participated more with           and 
                    than users in Malawi with            and 
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Table 4.21: Means for items underlying user participation in ISAC 
These results were not in support hypothesis H2 which posits that participation of 
users in ISRM in South Africa is the same as that of users in Malawi dependent on 
national cultures. The differences in user behaviour as influenced by culture are 
reflected in the outcomes of the users’ participation in ISRM. Therefore, one 
country’s success in information security management as a result of user 
participation in ISRM would not imply another country’s success.  
4.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter presents the results from data analysis as well as the discussions for 
the findings. First, the chapter presents the demographic characteristics of the 
study participants. These are based on educational and professional qualifications 
as well as the industrial types. Second, the chapter outlines quantitative data 
analysis results which are structured in four sub sections: locality and dispersion, 
distribution, goodness of the data and reliability checks. Third, the chapter 
provides the qualitative data analysis results. The forth section presents results for 
the hypothetical tests which were conducted in order to check or validate the 
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter summarizes the study by identifying the research methods used in the 
study. It also discusses the research findings as well as the implications of the 
study.  
5.1 Introduction 
This study was based on two problem areas. Firstly, there are contradicting views 
about how user participation in ISRM contributes to the management of 
information security. Users are portrayed as a weak links to information security 
(Dojkovski et al., 2011; Lim et al., 2009; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007; Steele 
& Wargo, 2007; Thomson et al., 2006) or as a solution to some of the information 
security problems (Chang & Ho, 2006; Siponen, 2005; Spears & Barki, 2010; 
Stanton & Stam, 2006; Whitman, 2008). Based on these contradictions, the first 
objective of this study was to understand how user participation in ISRM 
contributes to information security management. 
Literature suggests that culture influences user attitude and behaviour towards 
ISRM practices (Chow et al., 1994). However, studies which focus on 
understanding how different cultures influence user participation in ISRM 
practices are rare (Chang & Ho, 2006; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Spears & Barki, 2010). 
This study was also aimed at understanding how user participation in ISRM 
practices varies across nations of different national cultures.  
The study was guided by two research questions. Firstly, the researcher was 
interested in understanding how user participation in ISRM contributes to the 
efficient management of information security. Secondly, the researcher wanted to 
understand how national cultures influence user participation in ISRM practices 
which may have an impact on the management of information security.  
A mixed methods approach was employed in this study to collect, analyse and 
interpret data. The results acquired from qualitative methods were used to 
elaborate (complement) and to confirm (triangulate) those results acquired from the 
quantitative methods (Migiro & Magangi, 2011). 
5.2 Summary of the findings 
F1. The findings in this study showed that user participation in ISRM practices 
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F2. Secondly, the findings of the study revealed that participation of users in 
ISRM practices is different between South Africa and Malawi.  
F3. The findings of this study also showed that government and financial 
institutions have healthy appetites for information security management as 
compared to other industries. 
5.2.1 User participation in ISRM 
Spears and Barki (2010) suggest three areas of user participation in ISRM 
practices: user participation in ISRM, user participation in information security 
control, and user participation through accountability roles. Reflective items for 
each of these constructs were confirmed to have correlational links with 
improvement in information security control performance. This was found to be 
consistent with the literature which posts that user participation in ISRM 
contributes to the efficient management of information security (Chang & Ho, 2006; 
Siponen, 2005; Spears & Barki, 2010; Stanton & Stam, 2006; Whitman, 2008).  
5.2.2 Cultural influence on user participation in ISRM practices 
The comparison of the questionnaire item means for the data collected in South 
Africa and Malawi showed that there was significant difference between user 
participation in remediating defective controls for the two countries. While the t-
test results revealed the significance of this difference, an examination of the 
means for this item showed that users in Malawi do not participate in remediating 
defective controls to the same degree as users in South Africa do. 
Secondly, the t-test results also revealed a significant difference between user 
participation in information security awareness campaigns for the two countries. A 
comparison of means for user participation in information security awareness 
campaigns revealed that users in South Africa do not participate in information 
security awareness campaigns to the same degree as users in Malawi do. 
These differences in user participation roles in ISRM were attributed to differences 
in national cultures. This was based on Harrison (1992) and Chow et al. (1994) 
who posit that culture influences user behaviour towards management practices. 
5.2.3 Information security management appetites 
The findings of the study further suggest healthy appetites for information security 
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in the two countries. The healthy appetites were reflected by relatively large 
numbers of information security administrators and information systems auditors 
working in these industries as compared to other industries.   
5.3 Implications of the study  
5.3.1 Academic community 
Academic scholars with an appetite for global information security management 
would find this study as necessary. Research studies with particular focus on 
integrated information security management may be guided by the findings in this 
study as they outline the importance of national cultures in the way users behave 
towards ISRM practices. This study was one response to the recent calls for further 
examination of causal factors which influence behaviours in social networks within 
different cultures, race and ethnic groups (De Souza & Dick, 2009; Ellison, 
Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Yum & Hara, 2006). The findings of this study can 
therefore be used when planning and executing future research in the same 
research domain. 
5.3.2 Governments 
There are insignificant deterrent effects on domestic enforcement against cyber-
attacks (Pang et al., 2010). Interdependent information security management 
efforts allow governments to directly address information security through 
enforcement against cyber-attacks (Wang & Kim, 2009). It is therefore important 
for one country to understand how users in other countries perceive and respond 
to ISRM initiatives in order to have coordinated information security management 
efforts. This study provides knowledge on how users in South Africa and Malawi 
participate in ISRM. Information security management efforts involving the two 
countries would therefore use the findings of this study to draft and implement 
information security policy which would ensure policy harmonization.  
5.3.3 Practitioners 
Organisations also need to understand how national cultures influence people’s 
attitude and behaviour in countries that they conduct business with. This study 
highlights the differences in user participation in ISRM between users in South 
Africa and those in Malawi. While users in Malawi were found to participate more 
in information security awareness campaigns, users in South Africa participate 
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operating in these two countries would find the findings of this study necessary as 
they highlight user behavioural patterns as influenced by cultures in the two 
countries. This study would also be useful for IT companies that deploy global IT 
solutions as the successful implementations of the IT solutions largely depend on 
the users’ perceived ease of use of the IT solution.  
5.4 Weaknesses and limitations 
The low response rate to the survey questionnaire in the context of South Africa 
may have impacted the findings. The lack of local chapter in Malawi where 
participants to the study would have been selected from probabilistically so as to 
enable inference the study findings to a larger population also affected the quality 
and dependability of the study findings. However, considering the educational as 
well as professional profiles of the participants to the study, the findings of this 
study would arguably be of value to the academic community, government 
departments and transnational organisations.   
5.5 Considerations for future research 
This study calls for more research studies which would visibly explain the causal 
factors which influence user behaviours towards ISRM practices within different 
cultures, race and ethnic groups. While cultural influence on user participation 
and how this contributes to information security management was one of the 
objectives of this study, the other observable characteristics of culture also need to 
be understood. This study calls for more research which would explain how user 
awareness, responsibility, motivation and commitment over ISRM practices are 
influenced by different cultures and how these contribute to the management of 
information security. If conducted at regional level such as SADC, the studies can 
create good grounds for achieving globalisation in the management of information 
security.  
5.6 Thesis summary 
This thesis has reported the importance of understanding how national cultures 
influence user participation in ISRM which, in turn, contributes to the efficient 
management of information security. The study was in context of South Africa and 
Malawi. The study highlighted the importance for the academic community, 
governments and transnational organisations to understand how national cultures 
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Chapter 7 : Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Guide 
A. Demographic details 
1. What is the name of your organisation? 
2. How long have you worked for this organisation? 
3. What is your position or responsibility in the organisation? 
4. What is your highest professional qualification? 
5. Have you held any other position a part from the current one?  
6. How long have you been at your current position? (Number of Years) 
B. Knowledge about Information Security Risk Management  
7. What level of knowledge do you have on Information Technology (IT)? 
8. What training (if any) have you attended relating to Information Security?   
9. What do you understand by the terms Information Security, or Information 
Security Risk Management? 
10. How would you differentiate the terms Information Security and Information 
Security Risk Management? 
11. Have there been information security awareness campaigns in your organisation? 
(If No, skip to 13) 
12. How often are these campaigns conducted? 
13. What roles or activities are within the scope of Information Security Risk 
Management? 
14. What roles or tasks are performed by users that are within the scope of 
Information Security Risk Management? 
15. What roles are performed by users when the organisation analyses Information 
Security Risks? 
C. Participation of users in Information Security Risk Management through daily 
information security control 
16. Have users in your organisation actively participated in following roles associated 
with Information Security Control? 
(a) Granting access rights to information and information systems 
(b) Separation or segregation of duties 
(c) Definition of alerts, triggers or application controls 
(d) Analysis of exception reports 
(e) Participating on organisation-wide Information Security awareness campaigns 
(f) Determining risk levels which can be tolerated 
D. Participation of users in Information Security Risk Management via 
accountability roles 
17. During the past 12 months, have users in your organisation been assigned roles 
associated with management and accountability of roles such as the following? 
(a) Definition and documentation of roles and responsibilities 
(b) Assignment of roles and responsibilities for protection information resources 
(c) Data of process owners (business users) made responsible for specific controls 
(d) Reviews of Information Security policy 
(e) Communication of Information Security policy to all other employees 
(f) User support demonstrated for information security 
(g) Information Security Risk Management planning 
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18. Do you agree with the statement that users working with information in your 
organisation have increased awareness of information security policies, procedures 
and the need to ensure data integrity? 
(a) Strongly disagree (people most often need to be reminded to follow information 
security policy) 
(b) Moderately agree (many people seem aware, while many others do not seem to 
be aware) 
(c) Strongly agree (people often mention or ask questions to clarify, what is 
needed for information security)  
F. Demonstrated sense of ownership 
19. Do you agree with the statement that users who handle information have 
demonstrated a sense of ownership towards protecting the information integrity in 
the past 12 months? 
(a) Strongly disagree (users often need to be reminded to comply with information 
security controls or policies) 
(b) Agree and disagree (many users take ownership while many do not) 
(c) Strongly agree (most users are proactive in taking responsibility for 
information security) 
G. Control development and remediation 
20. Have functional users actively contributed in security control development and 
remediation by performing any of the following 
(a) Provide information needed by control designers? 
(b) Documentation of decision criteria for granting access to information systems? 
(c) Assessment of controls to identify those controls which need remediation? 
H. Perceived improvement in control development 
21. Has there been an improvement in the definition or implementation of each of the 
following:  
(a) Access control for system users? 
(b) Segregation of duties for system users? 
(c) Information security policy? 
I. Control performance via reduced deficiencies 
22. Total number or magnitude of control deficiencies for key controls has decreased in 
the past 12 months? 
(a) Strongly disagree (control deficiencies are much worse) 
(b) Agree and disagree (total number or magnitude decreased/increased) 
(c) Strongly agree (major improvement)  
J. Control performance via increased efficiencies 
23. To what degree have there been efficiency improvements made to the system of 
controls, by redesigning, consolidating, or automating key controls used to manage 
risks to information systems? 
(a) Much worse (important controls stopped, weakening security or controls very 
inefficient) 
(b) No change 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire 
Understanding the effects of user participation in Information Security Risk 






1. What is the name of your organisation? 
______________________________________  
2. In which industry is your organisation? 
______________________________________ 
3. Which region do you consider your primary residence? 
______________________________________ 
 
4. Enter the city/town where you operate? 
______________________________________ 
5. What is your position or responsibility in this organisation? 
______________________________________ 
 
6. How long (in years) have you been working on your current position? 
______________________________________ 
 
7. What is your highest educational/professional qualification? 
______________________________________ 
Knowledge about Information Security Risk Management 
1. What level of knowledge do you have on Information Technology (IT)? 
1. Novice (minimal knowledge of IT) (    ) 
2. Advanced beginner (working knowledge of IT still limited but 
recognisable after some experience) 
(    ) 
3. Competent (good working and background knowledge of IT) (    ) 
4. Proficient (deep understanding and practice of IT) (    ) 
5. Expert (authoritative knowledge and deep tacit understanding and 
practice of IT) 
(    ) 
 
2. What level of knowledge do you have on information security and/or 
information security risk management (ISRM)? 
1. Novice (minimal knowledge of ISRM) (    ) 
2. Advanced beginner (working knowledge of ISRM still limited but 
recognisable after some experience) 
(    ) 
3. Competent (good working and background knowledge of ISRM) (    ) 
4. Proficient (deep understanding and practice of ISRM) (    ) 
5. Expert (authoritative knowledge and deep tacit understanding and 
practice of ISRM) 
(    ) 
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4. What roles or activities are within the scope of Information Security Risk 
Management? (Enter each role/activity on a separate line) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
5. What roles are performed by users in your organisation which signify their 
participation in Information Security Risk Management? (Enter each role or 
activity on a separate line) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Does your organisation conduct any information security awareness 
campaigns? 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
7. If yes to the previous question, how often are these campaigns conducted? 
____________________________________________  
Information Security Risk Management 
1. In managing Information Security risks, do users in your organisation actively 
perform or contribute to decision-making in any of the following Information 
Security Risk Management activities? 
1.1. Documenting business processes or transactions for risk evaluation 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
1.2. Ensuring key controls exist to mitigate specific types of risks 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
1.3. Defining procedural controls for example rules for access control 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
1.4. Implementing controls 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
1.5. Reviewing and testing controls 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
1.6. Remediating defective controls 













P a g e  | 96  
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
1.7. Communicating Information Security regulatory initiatives 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
Information Security Controls 
2. Have users in your organisation actively participated in defining, reviewing, or 
approving any of the following which relates to Information Security Control? 
2.1. Granting access to information resources 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
2.2. Separation (segregation) of duties 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
2.3. Definition of alerts, triggers, or application controls 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
2.4. Analysis of exception reports 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
2.5. Participating in Information Security awareness campaigns 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
2.6. Determining risk tolerance (risk acceptance level) 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 















P a g e  | 97  
Accountability Roles 
3. During the past 12 months, have any of the following activities occurred in 
your organisation which provide accountability roles to users for Information 
Security Risk Management? 
3.1. Individual roles and responsibilities defined and documented 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
3.2. Roles and responsibilities for protecting information assigned 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
3.3. Users (data or process owners) made responsible for specific controls 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
3.4. Reviews of Information Security Policy 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
3.5. Information Security Policy communicated to all other users and 
stakeholders 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
3.6. Management support demonstrated for Information Security 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
3.7. Information Security planning 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
Awareness and sense of ownership 
4. "Users working with information have increased awareness of policies, 
procedures and the need to ensure information security" 
1. Strongly disagree (users often need to be reminded to follow 
security policy) 
(    ) 
2. Disagree (    ) 
3. Neutral (Not certain) (    ) 
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5. Strongly agree (users often ask for clarification on the 
information security policy) 
(    ) 
5. "During the past 12 months, users in your organisation who handle 
information have demonstrated a sense of ownership toward protecting the 
information integrity" 
1. Strongly disagree (users are often reminded about 
Information Security Policy) 
(    ) 
2. Disagree (    ) 
3. Neutral (Not certain) (    ) 
4. Agree (    ) 
5. Strongly agree (users proactively take responsibility for 
information security) 
(    ) 
6. During the past 12 months, users in your organisation have actively 
contributed in security control development and remediation by performing any 
of the following actions: 
6.1. Provide information needed by control designers 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
6.2. Documentation of criteria for granting access to information systems 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
6.3. Assessment of controls to identify those which need remediation 
1. Yes  (    ) 
2. No (    ) 
3. Don’t know (    ) 
7. To what extent has there been an improvement (if any) in the definition or 
implementation of each of the following as part of your organisation's 
Information Security Risk Management efforts? 
7.1. Access control for system users 
1. Much worse  (    ) 
2. Worse (    ) 
3. No change (    ) 
4. Better (    ) 
5. Much better (    ) 
7.2. Segregation of duties for system users 
1. Much worse  (    ) 
2. Worse (    ) 
3. No change (    ) 
4. Better (    ) 
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7.3. Information Security Policy 
1. Much worse  (    ) 
2. Worse (    ) 
3. No change (    ) 
4. Better (    ) 
5. Much better (    ) 
8. "During the past 12 months, the total number or magnitude of control 
deficiencies for key controls has decreased signifying improvement in control 
efficiencies" 
1. Strongly disagree (increased number or magnitude of control 
deficiencies) 
(    ) 
2. Disagree (    ) 
3. Neutral (no change) (    ) 
4. Agree (    ) 
5. Strongly agree (decreased number or magnitude of control 
deficiencies) 
(    ) 
9. To what degree have there been efficiency improvements made to the system of 
controls by redesigning, consolidating, or automating key controls used to 
manage Information Security risk? 
1. Much worse (weak controls are stopped thereby weakening 
security further) 
(    ) 
2. Worse (    ) 
3. Neutral (no improvement) (    ) 
4. Better (    ) 
5. Much better (a major focus in the organisation; extensive 
improvements made) 
(    ) 
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Appendix C: Letter of Introduction 
Department of Information 
Systems 
Leslie Commerce Building 
Engineering Mall, Upper Campus 
Private Bag. Rondebosch 7701 
Cape Town 
Tel: (021) 650-2261 
Fax No: (021) 650-2280 
Masters Dissertation: Participant Consent Form 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am an Information Systems Masters student at the University of Cape Town. I am 
conducting a case study to assess the impact of user participation in Information Security 
Risk Management (ISRM).
As part of the research process, I will be conducting interviews with some members of staff
at “organisation” to gain an understanding on user participation roles in ISRM. Your
participation in this research is greatly appreciated.
The questions for the interview have been approved by the University’s Ethics committee.
Please note that participation is voluntary and that all data collected will be treated as 
confidential. The findings from the study will be kept anonymous and will be published as
part of the research. If you are interested to receive a copy of the final report of the 
research, you are welcome to provide your email address and the results will be sent to you.
If you have any further queries, please feel free to contact either the researcher or Prof.
Michael Kyobe. Contact details are provided below.
Thank you for your time and cooperation 
Sincerely, 
Masters Student (Information Systems): 
Researcher : Dimson Kalelo-Phiri klldim001@uct.ac.za : 
Supervisor : Prof. Michael Kyobe Michael.Kyobe@uct.ac.za : 
Department of Information Systems 
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
By signing this form, you are agreeing to participate in the research project entitled 
“Understanding the effects of user participation in Information Security Risk Management: 
A comparative study of South Africa and Malawi” 
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Appendix D: Factor extraction  
Rotated Component Matrixa 
Questionnaire Items Components 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Q1.1: Documenting business processes or transactions for risk 
evaluation  
.755         
Q1.2: Ensuring key controls exist to mitigate specific types of risks     .599      
Q1.3: Defining procedural controls (rules for access control)  .808         
Q1.4: Implementing controls  .770         
Q1.5: Reviewing and testing controls  .508   .679      
Q1.6: Remediating defective controls     .690      
Q1.7: Communicating Information Security regulatory initiatives  .772         
Q2.1: Granting access to information resources   .523       
Q2.2: Separation (segregation) of duties    .838       
Q2.3: Definition of alerts, triggers, or application controls   .737       
Q2.4: Analysis of exception reports    .668     .528  
Q2.5: Participating in Information Security awareness campaigns        .636   
Q2.6: Determining risk tolerance (risk acceptance level)    .607       
Q3.1: Individual roles and responsibilities defined and documented     .630      
Q3.2: Roles and responsibilities for protecting information assigned         .504  
Q3.3: Users (data or process owners) made responsible for specific 
controls  
   .756      
Q3.4: Reviews of information security policy   -.625        
Q3.5: Information Security Policy communicated to all other users 
and stakeholders  
      .834   
Q3.6: Management support demonstrated for Information Security      .687     
Q3.7: Information security planning           
Q4: User increased awareness of policies, procedures and the need 
for information security  
     .984    
Q5: User demonstrated a sense of ownership toward protecting the 
information integrity  
     .983    
Q6.1. Provide information needed by control designers     .729     
Q6.2: Documentation of criteria for granting access to information 
systems  
    .854     
Q6.3: Assessment of controls to identify those which need 
remediation.  
    .539     
Q7.1: Access control for system users   .857        
Q7.2: Segregation of duties for system users  .803        
Q7.3: Information Security Policy  .762        
Q8: Decreased number of control deficiencies for key controls  .717        
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Appendix E: List of utility companies in Malawi 
Type Companies 
Water supply  Blantyre Water Board (BWB) 
 Central Region Water Board (CRB) 
 Eastern Region Water Board (ERWB) 
 Lilongwe Water Board (LWB) 
 Mzuzu Water Board (MWB) 
 Northern Region Water Board (NWB) 
 Southern Region Water Board (SRWB) 
Electricity  Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi (ESCOM) 
Mobile phone operators  Airtel 
 Malawi Telecommunications Limited (MTL) 
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Appendix F: Research time plan 
 
Due Date Duration Activity Deliverable 
(mont hs) 
19 May, 2011 Research proposal writing Research proposal 
25th July, 2011 2 Literarure review Literarure review repon 
30th Sep, 20 II 2 Research design Research design 
30th Nov, 2011 1 Review of srudy instruments Srudy instruments 
15th May, 2012 3 Data collection, analysis and 
interpretation of results 
30th May, 2012 0 .5 Thesis writing Thesis draft 
15th June, 2012 0 .5 Thesis writing Revised thesis draft 
15th Aug, 2012 1 Thesis writing Thesis completed 
versIOn 
